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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis1 examines contemporary industrial relations reorganization in the 
Cuban socialist system to explore the effects on, and impact of, worker participation o 
industrial relations transition.  In arguing that market liberalization has not 
substantially altered Cuban socialism, I focus attention on national institutions and the 
process for negotiating transition.  I assert that our understanding of the impact of 
market liberalization on industrial relations system actors can be enhanced through a 
better understanding of how the state and workers arrive at an agreement with respect 
to the underlying justification for economic change- what I call the “cognitive basis” 
for market reform.  Key to this negotiation process is how actors direct their emotions 
and attribute blame for adverse consequences of reform. 
 
                                                1	  The	  “thesis”	  submitted	  here	  is	  essentially	  a	  collection	  of	  literature	  reviews	  setting	  up	  the	  argument	  presented	  in	  the	  introduction.	  	  Data	  collection	  is	  ongoing,	  and	  it	  is	  my	  expectation	  that	  it	  will	  result	  in	  a	  completed	  dissertation	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  several	  chapters,	  including	  a	  methodological	  chapter	  and	  an	  analysis	  of	  field	  data.	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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“Cuba shall never revert to capitalism.”2  Those words were added to the 
Cuban constitution almost immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
which propelled the Cuban socialist state into unparalleled economic pressures for 
global market integration.  The study of the impact of global economic pressures on 
national industrial relations systems is surely not new, and this is certainly not the first 
study of the Cuban political economy.  However, Cuba provides an interesting case in 
the context of comparative transitions given its identity as Latin American, socialist 
and a single-party state.  It is also an opportune time for study of Cuban industrial 
relations transition and worker participation because Cuba has recently entered a new 
period of market liberalization, and is currently negotiating this “reorientation” with 
workers and their unions throughout the island. 
Background 
 The Cuban political economy and industrial relations system are ideal for 
studying the impact of market liberalization not only because of their resilience in the 
“context of the global collapse of socialism” (Gordy and Lee 2009), but also because 
of the state’s strategic policy decisions throughout the recent crisis of global 
capitalism.  Over thirty years following the declaration of Cuba as a socialist state, and 
more than fifty years after the overthrow of the most recent capitalist regime, Cuban 
economic policy continues to shift back and forth- at times in the direction of market 
liberalization and at times abruptly back toward recentralization.  Such policy 
                                                
2 Constitución de la República de Cuba (as modified on July 7, 1992), Art. 3. 
 2 
alternation has impacted Cuban relations in and of production, though perhaps not in 
ways expected or predicted from what we know about industrial relations transition in 
other contexts. 
A fierce debate has raged in Cuban studies over the nature and extent of 
market liberalization since the 1990s, its impact on the political stability of the state 
and the consequences for workers.  This discussion has been reignited in light of the 
September 2010 announcement from the state and the central trade union organization 
that Cuba is currently constructing a new economic model that will result in the shift 
of at least 1.2 million workers3 (of a labor force estimated at 5 million)4 from 
traditional employment in the state sector to the non-state sector, mostly in the form of 
increased self-employment.5  This announcement caught not only the attention of 
outside scholars, but has renewed a revolution-old internal national debate over the 
appropriate economic management system for Cuban socialism and the proper balance 
between market liberalization and social cohesion. 
The process for debate and negotiation of market reform in Cuba is rooted in 
its participatory mechanisms.  In fact, Cuban socialism, its underlying ideology and its 
supporting institutions make it a duty for workers to participate in discourse on the 
political economy and production organization.  Additionally, it is incumbent on the 
state, formally and informally, to ensure the protection of participatory mechanisms.  
Consequently, as required and provided by national institutions, this debate is 
                                                
3 Source: Granma. September 24, 2010. 
4 Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html (Accessed 
on September 5, 2010). 
5 Source: Granma. September 24, 2010. 
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currently being undertaken between the state, workers and their mass organizations in 
worker assemblies in work centers throughout the island.  As these debates are taking 
place as this thesis is being written, it is an apt moment for examination of how 
national institutions constrain and empower actors during the process of negotiating 
market reform. 
Theoretical Frameworks 
A. Institutions 
To ensure that I view the institutions, roles and identities of the actors in the 
Cuban system consistently with how Cuban scholars and practitioners view 
themselves, I employ, as do Cuban scholars,6 the Gramscian microeconomic 
production model, which holds the communist party as the intellectual creator of 
political culture and consciousness (Comisso 1979; Gramsci 1971).  As such, it is 
charged with facilitating democracy for workers and ensuring that the state evolves in 
a politically legitimate way that binds the actors to the belief that existing institutions 
are the most appropriate (Lipset 1960).  In such a system, institutions, such as popular 
participation by workers at the base, matter for economic performance, 7 and states 
have a central role in the enforcement of institutionalized behavior (Deeg and Jackson 
2010).  In the Cuban socialist system, the Cuban Communist Party (“PCC”) is 
responsible for “organiz[ing] and guid[ing] common efforts toward the goal of 
constructive socialism” (República de Cuba 2002), while the state, workers and their 
mass organizations are required to work collectively to advance Cuban socialism.  
                                                
6 Interview with Professor Martina Laza Figuerrero, September 20, 2010. 
7 Lecture on Marxist theory, Leninism and the politics of capitalism and socialism by 
Professor Teresa Ramón, la escuela Lázaro Peña, Havana, Cuba, September 27, 2010. 
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Approaching the study of Cuban industrial relations with these concepts in mind is 
imperative for understanding the importance to the participatory process of the 
framing of the underlying reasons for proposed market reform. 
B. Conflict Theory 
I will employ a relatively new theory of social movements and collective 
action, referred to as conflict theory, in an effort to better understand the politics of 
change in the industrial relations context.  I first encountered conflict theory in a 
comparative post-socialist study by Crowley and Ost (2001), in which they seek to 
explain the weakness of Eastern European unions as social and political actors during 
the post-communist transitions of the 1980s and 1990s.  They proposed conflict theory 
as a method for acknowledging the importance of emotions in political processes and 
for understanding the relationship between anger and mobilization. 
Traditional social movements literature assumes that state elite are rational 
actors that pursue their interests unemotionally.  To overcome this presumption of 
dispassionate rationality, resource mobilization theory reinserts emotion as a variable 
in the political equation (Ost 2004).  The difference between resource mobilization 
theory and conflict theory is the weight given to emotions as a variable.  Instead of 
treating emotions as just another factor, conflict theory places it at the center of 
politics, holding that citizens require mobilization one way or the other, particularly at 
times of transition.  Emotions and anger then become vital and fundamental to the 
analysis of the strategic actions (Ost 2004) of different groups. 
Under the conflict theory framework, political leaders help citizens decide who 
to blame for negative outcomes, and convince them of an appropriate enemy at which 
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to direct anger or frustration (Ost 2004).  To this end, conflict theory is used in 
conjunction with blame attribution theory, which holds that political leaders succeed 
when (1) they are able to convince citizens to accept the enemy they have designated 
and (2) they are able to frame failures and successes in persuasive ways (Ost 2004).  
For example, Javeline (2003) showed that protests were more likely to occur if blame 
was attributed specifically on the basis of whether an entity is the cause of an 
undesired condition or to blame for the inability to solve it.  This allows citizens to 
identify the “us” and the “them” in any conflict and to determine which “we” they are 
going to support.  Ost described the usefulness of conflict theory and blame attribution 
very succinctly when he wrote: 
“Identifying enemies and mobilizing emotions against 
those enemies is the way by which political leaders get 
citizens to do what these political leaders want them to 
do- whether that means participating in a protest, voting 
for their party, or supporting a certain policy in an 
opinion poll.  Political mobilization means getting 
citizens to respond to the narrative and target that you 
put forward.  It means getting citizens to accept your 
friend-enemy dichotomy.” (Ost 2004: 229) 
 
When examining the process of industrial relations transition, the conflict 
theory framework will allow analysis of the strategic actions of the state and the 
responses of workers during the transition process.  I chose conflict theory over other 
frameworks for studying worker participation in the Cuban case because of the 
extensive use by the state of anti-imperialism, anti-U.S. sentiment and nationalism in 
mobilizing national pride in the successes of Cuban socialism while directing 
responsibility for economic failures at its ever-available enemy- the United States.  
Furthermore, and not insignificantly, over the course of my fieldwork, I’ve yet to 
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observe or converse with any Cuban- worker, union, state or party- regardless of the 
formality of the sector, age of the respondent, or employment status- who speaks 
dispassionately with respect to the politics of production or political economy.  For 
this reason, understanding how the Cuban state manages the anger and frustrations of 
workers facing the negative consequences of market liberalization is critical to 
understanding worker participation in, and response to, market reform. 
Arguments 
In this section I set forth my argument with respect to Cuban industrial 
relations transition.  I note here that it is not my intention to contend that the Cuban 
case is unique, though it may prove to be so.  Given that the relationship between 
market liberalization and worker participation is understudied at this point, I offer the 
Cuban case as a starting point for understanding how participatory institutions 
influence industrial relations transition. 
The main argument of this thesis is that Cuban socialism has not been 
significantly altered by market liberalization because its participatory institutions and 
practices provide a process for workers to negotiate the nature and extent of 
liberalization.  Cuban socialism as an institution, and as an industrial relations system, 
is stable and adaptable because its complementary institutions are embedded with 
participatory processes that allow the state and workers to reach new agreement on the 
nature or extent of reform possible within Cuban socialism during transition.  The key 
to the continued stability of the Cuban system is the process for reaching agreement on 
the balance between social cohesion and market liberalization, while simultaneously 
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redefining “Cuban socialism” to accommodate and incorporate incremental 
adjustments to the institution by reformers. 
In practice, the state proposes a change in market policy, which triggers 
constitutional and statutory workplace democracy institutions, namely worker 
assemblies held in work centers throughout the island.  These formal mechanisms for 
debate and persuasion, along with informal mechanisms of public discourse, including 
the media and public venues, set the stage for a process of negotiation between the 
state and labor in which the state seeks to convince workers that the underlying 
justification for its market reform is one it shares with workers- which in this case is 
the survival of Cuban socialism.  I refer to the underlying justification for transition as 
the “cognitive basis” for market reform.  Simply stated, if the state can convince 
workers that they share a “cognitive basis” for reform, it is more likely that the 
workers will support or at least collaborate with the state during the participatory 
process. 
The major way in which the Cuban state has accomplished and sustained 
popular support for its market policies, regardless of the direction of market 
liberalization and despite the nature, extent or sequence of reform, is through 
successful blame attribution for any adverse consequences workers suffer as a result of 
reform.  Specifically, the Cuban state has been able to create an “us” versus “them” 
atmosphere where blame for most of the social and economic failures of the 
Revolutionary government have been assigned to an enemy- the United States and its 
imperialism- while credit for social goods provisions has been assigned to the 
institutions of Cuban socialism.  In other words, under conflict theory, the Cuban state 
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has solved the blame attribution problem by successfully targeting the U.S. as the 
major cause of adverse effects of domestic economic policy. This blame attribution 
has allowed the state to experiment with market liberalization with the support of 
workers and without sacrificing political stability.  In creating the “Cuban socialism” 
vs. “US imperialism” frame, the Cuban government has at once solved its own 
collective action problem (i.e. keeping its anti-imperialist social movement afloat) and 
kept any potential opposition leaders from solving theirs (e.g. mobilization leading to 
pluralistic political democratization). 
If my argument holds, as long as the state is successful during the participatory 
process in convincing workers that the policies it wishes to enact share a cognitive 
basis in the survival of Cuban socialism, and that someone else it to blame for the 
necessary hardships that accompany market liberalization, it is possible to make 
significant changes to political economy and industrial relations while maintaining 
political legitimacy and stability and delaying significant worker protest. 
Although this thesis does not seek to predict the future of Cuban socialism, I 
would suggest that the success of the Cuban state, while stable at present, is less 
certain if workers or opposition groups are able to redirect blame at the state for not 
solving the societal and economic problems facing Cuban workers. Whether there will 
be significant worker protest or collective action related to recent, or future, economic 
reforms will be a question of whom ultimately solves the blame attribution problem 
more persuasively during the participatory process extended to workers under the 
Cuban socialist system. 
Alternative Arguments 
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I have argued that the reason Cuban socialism remains relatively stable despite 
market liberalization is because its industrial relations system contains participatory 
processes that allow workers to negotiate reform with the state.  As will be clear from 
the literature review on comparative transitions,8 there are very few studies focusing 
on the relationship between market liberalization and worker participation.  However, 
Mary Gallagher (2007) does offer a theory for the impact of market liberalization on 
the political stability of one-party states that has direct implications for my argument 
and leads to the research question driving this thesis.  Below I discuss her theory 
regarding the stability of single-party “authoritarian” regimes during market 
liberalization, and explain the differences in our arguments.  In the end we are left 
with a question as to the importance of participatory institutions to the impact of 
market liberalization on industrial relations outcomes- exactly the research question 
that my argument purports to answer. 
In arguing that market liberalization can actually strengthen single-party states, 
Gallagher (2007) challenged traditional theories which predicted that (1) economic 
growth, development and global market integration lead to political pluralism; (2) 
there is a convergence towards an idyllic political economic model of market 
capitalism and pluralistic democratization; and (3) global market pressures lead to a 
reduction in the role of the state.  Comparing the Chinese transition to those in other 
socialist states, she found that the resilience of Chinese communism could not be 
completely explained by existing arguments. She argues convincingly that the 
                                                
8 A review of literature on comparative  industrial relations transitions is presented in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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commonly accepted notions- which predicted that the gradual pace of reform and 
rapid economic growth lead to political stability- were only partially explanatory 
because other socialist transitions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union also 
implemented market reform gradually to very different ends (2007: 9). 
Instead, Gallagher focuses on a state’s strategic choices in the (1) type of 
economic reform, (2) pace for implementation and (3) sequencing of reform (2007: 9).  
She places heavy emphasis on the Chinese use of extensive foreign direct investment 
(“FDI”) liberalization as a “laboratory” for experimenting with economic restructuring 
(2007: 6).  The sequencing of reform, starting with the test case of FDI liberalization, 
followed by privatization, then state-enterprise reform allowed China to radically grow 
its non-state sector without dealing with the social backlash that could have erupted 
from simultaneous widespread privatization (2007: 10).  Gallagher argues that the 
measured pace of reform in China increased political stability by slowly dismantling 
the social contract between the state and the workers in order to delay worker 
perspicacity of a “full assault” on socialism (2007: 11). 
In support of her theory, Gallagher points out that Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union focused on domestic enterprise reform initially (Marangos 2004)9, as 
opposed to China’s strategic choice of rapid non-state development through FDI 
liberalization at the outset.  In terms of type, pace and sequence, Cuba’s economic 
restructuring would likely fall somewhere between the Soviet Union and China in that 
Cuban market liberalization has been limited to the economy, leisurely, mostly 
                                                
9 The Soviet focus on state enterprise reform was so intense that Clark (1992) stated 
that “it is not the state which is privatising the soviet enterprise, but the soviet 
enterprise which is privatising the state” (1992: 5). 
 11 
directed at state-owned enterprise reform, with restricted FDI liberalization.  If the 
sequencing of the reforms is determinative or key, as Gallagher asserts, and 
gradualness lacks the importance that traditional literature claims, then one would 
expect Cuba’s outcome to more resemble that of the Soviet Union’s than China’s, yet 
Cuban socialism survives and maintains popular support among workers.  What might 
also be key in explaining the stability of the Chinese and Cuban one-party states? 
To explore this question, I bring attention to Gallagher’s assertion that it was 
the need for political legitimacy that drove the Chinese central government’s desire to 
achieve rapid growth rates (2007: 58).  Other scholars have noted similarly that China 
recruited more foreign investment because its political legitimacy was predicated on 
economic growth (Dickson 2007).  According to Gallagher (2007), the state itself was 
responsible for equating its political legitimacy with economic development by 
framing economic growth as a necessity for the advancement of Chinese nationalism 
and the country’s “entry into the realms of industrialization and modernization” 
(Gallagher 2007: 7).  In the lexicon of conflict theory, the Chinese central government 
mobilized workers in support of reform by successfully framing the public debate 
about market liberalization from whether the reforms were capitalist, to whether it was 
in the nation’s best interest- in other words from a debate over “liberalism” to one of 
“nationalistic developmentalism” (Gallagher 2007).  Evidence that the reframing was 
successful was that it fueled a competition between local government officials for 
recruiting more FDI for their regions.  “[L]ocal initiatives in attracting FDI followed 
the incentives set by the central government.  The competitive drive for FDI was a 
 12 
natural result of … the political and economic importance given to FDI by the central 
government” (2007: 57). 
Keeping Gallagher’s comments on political legitimacy in mind, I believe the 
argument I set forth in the introduction of this thesis can help explain more clearly the 
stability of both the Chinese and Cuban states, as well as suggest an explanation for 
variation in worker responses.  I suggest that the Chinese and Cuban regimes were 
able to maintain or strengthen their political rule despite market liberalization because 
each was able to convince its citizens that the “cognitive basis”- which I defined 
previously as the underlying justification- for reform was one they shared.  In the 
Chinese case, the state successfully presented the foundation for reform as the pursuit 
of Chinese nationalism through developmentalism.  Similarly, the Cuban state 
persuaded workers that market liberalization was justified because it was the only way 
to save Cuban socialism.  However, in the Chinese case scholars have noted an 
increasing amount of worker protest directed at local state officials (Lee 2007), 
particularly in firms with FDI (Gallagher 2007).  But there have been no reports of 
significant worker protest as of yet in the Cuban case. 
I suggest that the variation in labor outcomes calls attention to differences in 
national participatory processes.  As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, 
market liberalization in China has been linked to the absence of worker participation 
institutions (Li 2004; Gaochao 2004), which has been found to be a factor in 
increasing levels of worker fragmentation and dissatisfaction, as well as growing 
feelings of marginalization (Gallagher 2007).  Throughout its transition, the Chinese 
state has dismantled participatory mechanisms and increased managerial control over 
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production (Li 2004) leading to “passionate” worker protests directed at local leaders 
because of perceptions of unfairness in the administration of new legal institutions or 
for violating the social contract established between the worker and state under 
Chinese communism (Lee 2007).  In contrast, the Cuban state employed national 
participatory institutions to allow the Cuban workers to debate the nature and extent of 
reform and the new boundaries of Cuban socialism.  In fact, scholars have found that 
since the transition, the Cuban state has “liberalized” its participatory process 
(Fernandes 2003), allowing Cuban workers to redefine Cuban socialism to include the 
reforms it feels necessary to save it. 
The distinction between my theory and Gallagher’s poses a related question of 
why the Cuban state would choose to employ participatory institutions instead of just 
dismantling them like the Chinese.  Accepting Gallagher’s assertion that China’s 
strategic choices were based in its need for political legitimacy, I bring in the post-
socialist work of Mitchell Orenstein10 to help establish a link between political 
legitimacy and a state’s “cognitive basis” for reform.   Under Orenstein’s “democratic 
policy alternation” theory, he argues that political legitimacy was conditioned on the 
strict adherence of post-socialist governments to new democratic institutions.  Thus, a 
state’s strategic action during economic transition is constrained by national 
                                                
10 The literature review in Chapter Four contains a more detailed account of 
Orenstein’s policy alternation theory in the context of post-socialist market 
liberalizations.  The limited discussion of his theory here is used only to highlight 
variation in the Chinese and Cuban cases that point to the need for focusing on the 
importance of participatory institutions in the national processes of negotiating market 
reform. 
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democratic institutions, forcing governments to take popular demands into account in 
order to delay voter protest. 
Unlike the 1989 democratizations in Eastern and Central Europe that formed 
the basis of Orenstein’s study, Cuba is not in the midst of a transition to a pluralistic 
political democracy; however, Orenstein’s democratic policy alternation theory can be 
used in conjunction with my “cognitive basis” argument to explain why the Cuban 
state is “forced” to respect national participatory institutions during transition.  
Specifically, the Cuban system establishes national workplace democracy 
institutions,11 which constrain the state and “force” it to negotiate political and 
economic reform with workers.  During this process the state must convince workers 
that the cognitive basis for reform is a value shared by workers and the state.  Since 
the Cuban government chose the preservation of Cuban socialism and its institutions 
as its cognitive basis, its political legitimacy is predicated on strict adherence to the 
workplace democracy institutions that form the structure of Cuban socialism. 
In sum, Gallagher’s work on the stability of one-party states during market 
liberalization provides a good explanation for why the Chinese state has maintained, if 
not strengthened its “authoritarian rule.” However, heavy emphasis on the type and 
sequence of reform does not fully explain the stability of Cuban socialism.  Decreases 
in participatory mechanisms and rising worker protest in China as compared to the 
Cuban case leads us question the importance of participatory institutions to the impact 
                                                
11 A detailed discussion of the existing theoretical and empirical knowledge of Cuba’s 
participatory mechanism is contained in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  Fieldwork will be 
necessary to address the effectiveness of the institutions, though there is no question 
that they exist and that they are employed.  I expect field data to support arguments 
that they are in fact democratic institutions (Fuller 1992). 
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of market liberalization on industrial relations outcomes- the very question this thesis 
attempts to explore. 
Summary 
I have argued that Cuban socialism remains stable in the face of market 
liberalization because the institutions governing industrial relations provide 
participatory mechanisms that establish a process by which workers and the state 
negotiate the nature and extent of reform possible under Cuban socialism.  The key to 
the continued stability of the Cuban state is predicated on its use of participatory 
institutions to negotiate an agreement on the balance between market liberalization 
and social concerns, while simultaneously adapting Cuban socialism to include 
incremental adjustments to the institution itself.  During the process, if the state can 
convince workers that they share a “cognitive basis” for reform and can attribute 
blame for negative consequences of reform elsewhere, it is more likely that workers 
will support the state during the transition process, which could lead to a delay in 
worker protest. 
In the next chapter, I review existing literature on the Cuban political economy 
and industrial relations system.  In Chapter 3 I review existing literature relating to the 
relationship between market liberalization and industrial relations transition.   Chapter 
4 sets forth the literature on comparative transformations in the Latin American, post-
socialist and Sino-Vietnamese regions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CUBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
SYSTEM 
 
Introduction and Theoretical Debates 
This chapter seeks to synthesize relevant Cuban studies literature with respect 
to the Cuban political economy and industrial relations system.  This is not an easy 
task.  Cuban studies since the Cold War has been characterized by paradigmatic 
dissonance in the form of contrasting ontology, epistemology and methodology, 
leading to a poor understanding of the reality for Cuban workers.  These contrasting 
perspectives occur in both theoretical and empirical studies and paint very different 
pictures of Cuban society, institutions and the relationships between the actors 
(Tuchlin, Prieto, Bobeo and Hernandez 2005).  In fact, the field is so polarized that the 
choice to study Cuba is considered a political choice in and of itself, and the questions 
the author asks, as well as whether that researcher is geographically located within or 
outside of the island, often defines his or her politics (Tulchin, Prieto, Bobeo and 
Hernandez 2005; Fernández 2004). 12  International relations scholar Damian 
Fernández explains the considerable problems with Cuban studies: 
                                                
12 Damian Fernández (2004) describes five types of epistemology characterizing 
Cuban studies that lead to different theoretical approaches, topic selection and politics 
in the field.  They are: (1) the “epistemology of geography” referring to the 
prejudgment of a scholar’s work depending on whether he or she is “from allá or 
acá,” (he or she resides on or off the island); (2) the “epistemology of 
exceptionalism,” describing the tendency of some scholars to treat Cuba as an outlier 
with no comparison; (3) the “epistemology of political imperative,” assigning a 
political position to an author simply because he or she writes about Cuba; (4) the 
“epistemology of teleology,” describing the tendency to see the 1959 Revolution, or 
its transition from it, as inevitable and (4) the “epistemology of tabula rasa” (clean 
slate), which views Cuban society as starting with the Revolution.  
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“Since the 1960s, the study of politics in Cuba seemed 
to require taking sides not only theoretically or 
methodologically, but also ideologically in a much 
narrower political sense as if scholars were at the 
vanguard of the revolutionary process or its opposition. 
A generation of U.S. scholars influenced by the 
revisionism of the New Left and the Civil Rights 
movement has had time to study Cuba. At the same 
time, the first wave of Cuban scholars in the United 
States, many of whom had left the island quite young, 
turned their attention to Cuban matters. Suspicion of 
them/us studying Cuba never ceased, not even after 
post-structuralism and feminism all but decapitated the 
rational, objective, detached observer” (Fernández 
2004). 
 
Scholars have described these strict dichotomies in the field as “ideology versus 
reality, theory versus practice, pragmatism versus idealism” (Gordy 2006).13  It is 
critical, then, that a dialogue is established between opposing interpretations that have 
resulted in no clear consensus with respect to life on the island or predictions for its 
future (Tulchin, Prieto, Bobeo and Hernandez 2005).  It is my hope that this thesis is a 
step in that direction. 
 One of the major methodological and theoretical debates in the Cuban studies 
literature concerns Cuban “exceptionalism” and the appropriate, if any, comparative 
cases.  Some scholars both within and outside the island have viewed the Cuban case 
as so unique as to preclude or seriously limit country and regional comparison 
(Whitehead 2007).  This perspective has been described by Damian Fernández (2004) 
as the “epistemology of exceptionalism,” found to be based on ideological 
considerations rather than analytical principles (Armony 2005).  Ariel Armony (2005) 
                                                
13 See John Kirk and Peter McKenna (1999) for a good description of the ideological 
biases that penetrate Cuban studies. 
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urges researchers to remove such ideological “straightjackets” and probe into the 
admittedly tricky question of a suitable typology for comparative work, which likely 
will carry many limitations, but could be more valuable than not.  However, consensus 
on typology has been difficult to achieve and has yet been reached, with some scholars 
suggesting a typology based on political regime, which would situate Cuba in a class 
with certain Asian, African or Middle Eastern states (Armony 2005), while others 
suggest that Cuba must be analyzed in comparison to “Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
and the Third World” (Tuchlin, Prieto, Bobeo and Hernandez 2005).  This thesis looks 
briefly to comparative industrial relations transformations in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, but suggests that due to similarities in historical legacies, critical 
junctures and political regime discussed in this chapter and Chapter 4, the most logical 
comparative cases are likely the single-party communist regimes in China and 
Vietnam. 
 A second debate concerns the conceptualization of transition and 
transformation in the Cuban political economy.  Helen Yaffe (2009) divides the two 
major camps into “Cubanologists” and “Cubanists.”  Cubanologists tend to view Cuba 
from the perspective that the 1959 Revolution was a “rupture” in Cuban history; that 
political transition is inevitable; and that Cuba lacks democracy.  They tend focus on 
questions concerning the necessary and precipitating factors of political and economic 
transition (Tuchlin, Prieto, Bobeo and Hernandez 2005) and view transition as 
proceeding in one direction from revolutionary politics to capitalism.14  U.S. 
                                                
14 Prominent Cubanologists include Haroldo Dilla, Luis Suárez, Rafael Hernández and 
Mayra Espina. 
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politicians are thought to have had a hand in supporting this line of academic study 
(Yaffe 2009) for use in its “aggressive promotion” (Fernandes 2004) of the “liberal 
free-market democratization” (Gordy and Lee 2009) through legislation establishing 
the economic embargo and restricting the travel of U.S. citizens and researchers to the 
island.15  A point that Cuban scholars and officials are quick to point out in political 
and economic debates with its own people or with outsiders. 
 The other side of the debate, composing the camp to which Yaffe 
would refer to as the Cubanists, has grown out of the failure of the Cubanologists to 
accurately explain the lack of transition in Cuba.  Yaffe (2009) asserts that such failure 
has led to the Cubanist approach to the study of Cuba that sees “Cuba as a country, not 
a doctrine.” Scholars in this camp tend to view most of the economic transitions as 
mere hiccups, or adjustments, in the long-term transformation to socialism.  However, 
she admits that this school of Cuban studies suffers from political and social biases as 
well. 
From this battle between Cubanologists and Cubanists comes a third line of theorists, 
of which I am one, that view Cuba as having options other than pure capitalism or 
pure socialism.  Agreeing that Cuban socialism remains intact, Katherine Gordy 
                                                
15 The U.S. position is explicitly stated in legislation such as the Cuban Democracy 
Act of 1992 (also known as the Torricelli Act, accessible at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/democ_act_1992.html) and the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (also known as the Helms-
Burton Act, accessible at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/statutes/libertad.pdf) .  The 
Obama administration is currently considering lifting the travel ban (See “Obama May 
Ease Cuba Travel Ban” at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/17/uscuba-travel-
ban-may-be-_n_684440.html), but there appears to be little to no indication of lifting 
the economic embargo. 
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(2006) points out that the tendency of researchers to think of the transition in terms of 
a competition between market and revolution leads to an obscuring of other options 
within socialism.  Similarly, Max Azicri (2000) has studied change in Cuban politics 
since the revolution, and he concludes that what is taking place is not a transformation 
to market economy, but rather a “radical reinvention” of Cuban socialism. 
 Despite the epistemological presumptions and political leanings of the 
literature, the empirical studies from these three main theoretical approaches to 
capturing the realities of transition in the Cuban political economy and industrial 
relations system have provided a starting point.  The literature reviewed in this chapter 
comes from a cross-section of these theoretical perspectives and sets the stage for 
contextualizing the Cuban case for consideration under existing theoretical 
frameworks for understanding Cuban industrial relations transition.  I first describe the 
Cuban political economy and the transitions occurring from the early moments of its 
post-revolutionary development until present day.  I then set forth the Cuban industrial 
relations systems and its supporting institutions, noting the impact of market 
liberalization on the system and its actors when known. 
The Political Economy 
A. Background 
The Republic of Cuba has a current population of roughly 11.5 million and a 
GDP estimated at $111.1 billion USD.16 Important economic sectors today include 
                                                
16 Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName=Cuba&countryCode=cu&regionCo
de=ca&rank=64#cu (Accessed on July 14, 2010). 
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agriculture (4.3 percent of GDP; 20 percent of labor force), industry (21.6 percent of 
GDP; 19.4 percent of labor force) and services (74 percent of GDP; 60.6 percent of 
labor force).17  Currently its largest industry and most important sector18 is tourism, 
officially employing approximately 100,000 workers (EIU 2008) of a labor force 
estimated at 5 million,19 with an unknown number assumed to be working in the 
informal sectors surrounding the industry (EIU 2008).  As of 2009, the Cuban 
unemployment rate20 was estimated at 1.7 percent, the 8th lowest in the world.21 
Cuba has spent much of the last fifty years in economic and political isolation 
from the United States, under whose economic blockade it has been severely limited 
in direct or extensive global market participation.22  Despite such external political and 
economic interference, at the end of the 1980s, Cuba was one of only two Latin 
                                                
17 Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html (Accessed 
on September 5, 2010). 
18 For more economic data on Cuba from 1989 through 1990, see Appendix A at the 
end of this thesis. 
19 Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html (Accessed 
on September 5, 2010). 
20 The Cuban state and union do not use the world “unemployment,” particularly when 
referring to the approximately 1.2 million workers that will be shifted from state 
employment.  Instead, they describe these workers as “disponibles,” meaning 
“available” to work in a more productive capacity- namely in the sector called “trabajo 
por cuenta propia,” which is self-employment. 
21 Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html?countryName=Cuba&countryCode=cu&regionCo
de=ca&rank=8#cu (Accessed on September 5, 2010). 
22 U.S. sanctions against Cuba were first imposed in 1963 by President Kennedy under 
the Cuban Assets Regulations issued shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
(http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/regs/31cfr515.pdf).  They 
were reinforced and toughened in 1992 with the Cuban Democracy Act and again in 
1996 with the Helms-Burton Act. 
 22 
American economies whose per capita incomes were higher at the end of the 1980s 
than at the beginning (Gordy 2006).  However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, along 
with the disappearance of subsidies and favorable trade treatment from it and its 
Eastern European trading partners, plunged Cuba into a severe economic crisis 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a) leading to the market liberalization reforms that are a 
subject of this thesis.  What follows now is a description of the development of the 
Cuban political economy from the 1959 revolution until present. 
B. The Cuban Revolution and Socialist Transformation 
Unlike the military coups that preceded it, Fidel Castro’s July 26th Movement, 
which started as a small guerrilla group, succeeded largely because of massive popular 
support from Cuban workers and peasants suffering under the dictatorship of 
Fulgencio Batista (Alexander 2002).  The 1959 Cuban Revolution has been given 
different meanings and significance by researchers from different fields.  For instance, 
it has been described in terms of its roots, with scholars labeling it both as a “popular 
movement” (Gordy and Lee 2009) or a “guerrilla movement” with popular support 
(Fernandes 2003).  It has also been described in terms of what it is thought to have 
achieved.  For example Sujatha Fernandes (2003) describes it as an achievement of 
nationalist goals as well as the attainment of a socialist state.  Finally, it has also been 
described as an ongoing process of social and political change (Fernandes 2003) and 
continued socialist transformation (Ludlam 2009).  As will become evident later, these 
distinctions in conceptualization become meaningful in the examination of the past, 
present and future responses of industrial relations system actors to global economic 
pressures and economic and industrial transition. 
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Despite the fact that the 1959 guerrilla-led seizure of the Cuban government 
was not a communist revolution at its inception (Yaffe 2009; Alexander 2002),23 there 
is no question that the resulting revolution sparked a radical break from existing 
capitalism on the island.  Although Cuba had not yet officially declared its revolution 
to be communist, or even socialist, at least some members of the movement held such 
a political ideology and were members of the communist and socialist parties 
(Alexander 2002).  Before 1959, Cuban capitalism had been more developed than any 
other Caribbean or Latin American country, as well as that of the Soviet Union (Yaffe 
2009).  However, the revolutionary leaders immediately eliminated the capitalist 
market economy through agrarian reform and the expropriation of foreign-owned 
property and private enterprises (Mesa-Lago 2004, Alexander 2002). 
As revolutionary leader Ché Guevara’s knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory 
grew in the years immediately following the revolution, so did his influence on the 
new political economy of Cuba (Yaffe 2009).  More specifically, Guevara sought to 
construct a Cuban brand of socialism that involved not only a transformation of the 
economy, but also the creation of a new Cuban society and the building of a new class 
consciousness in workers (Guevara 1967).  Economic historian Helen Yaffe (2009) 
asserts that after studying many country models, including the Soviet system, Guevara 
rejected Soviet-styled economic management in favor of one that at that time was 
distinctly Cuban.  One reason for this was his belief that Cuba and Russia had 
different starting points with respect to the development of capitalism in their 
                                                
23 But see Eusebio Mujal-León (2009), describing China, Vietnam and Cuba as each 
having intertwined nationalist and communist revolutions. 
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respective revolutions and that the Soviet model prioritized industrialization over the 
political and ideological development of workers (Yaffe 2009).  Consequently, 
because an acceptable economic model for simultaneously increasing productivity and 
working class consciousness could not be found (Yaffe 2009), Guevara ultimately 
found inspiration within Cuba’s own borders. 
Guevara’s Budget Finance System 
Impressed by what he believed were the technically and managerially superior 
foreign-run enterprises that existed in Cuba prior to the revolution (Yaffe 2009), 
Guevara ultimately developed an economic management system premised on the 
theory that capitalist management techniques and advanced technology can, and 
should, be used for socialist ends (Guevara 1967).  In her book about Guevara’s role 
as political economist, Yaffe (2009) suggests that for Guevara this posed no 
philosophical or ideological conflict under Cuba’s brand of Marxism-Leninism: 
“There was no contradiction in basing a socialist 
economic management system on capitalist corporate 
structures, and Guevara realized the logic of this process 
as his Marxist analysis deepened.  Marx had argued that 
communism would arise out of the fully developed 
capitalist mode of production and he showed how the 
tendency to the concentration of capital, to monopoly, 
was inherent in the system.  Therefore, monopoly form 
of capitalism is more developed than a ‘prefect 
competition’ or ‘free market’ stage of development.  The 
Soviet system was built upon early and underdeveloped 
capitalism, incomparable to the technologically and 
administratively advanced firms in Cuba.  Guevara was 
certain that a socialist economic management system 
that emerged out of monopoly capitalism would also be 
more advanced, efficient and productive (Yaffe 2009). 
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Guevara went on to develop a centralized system of economic management 
that imported and developed the most advanced management techniques and 
technology, whether capitalist or socialist, with the goal of increasing productivity 
while simultaneously transferring production decision-making to worker control at the 
enterprise level (Yaffe 2009).  Guevara’s system, known as the Budget Finance 
System (“BFS”), 24 used both material and moral incentives to establish productivity 
and efficiency as an obligation and social duty of the Cuban worker, creating a new 
relationship between the state and the worker.  Although Guevara enjoyed popular 
support among workers and political elite, his ideas about economic management were 
strongly debated within Cuba.  These internal differences in opinion over whether 
Guevara’s BFS system or a Soviet-style system was more appropriate for Cuban 
socialism have been recorded in history as “The Great Debate” of 1963-1965 (Pérez-
Stable 1974). 
The Great Debate of 1963-1965 
The Great Debate was a process of national discussion within Cuba as to the 
best manner of managing a socialist political economy.  Silverman (1971) describes it 
as a debate between those, like Guevara, who wanted to create institutions to ensure 
the development of socialist consciousness in workers through an emphasis on moral 
incentives, and the “economic rationalists” who favored the Soviet-model of heavy 
material incentives in building Cuban socialism.  As will be shown in the discussion 
on the transitions within the socialist transformation and swings in economic policy 
                                                
24 Yaffe’s (2009) summary of the key components and philosophy of the BFS system 
can be found in Appendix A of this thesis. 
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from the 1990s through present, the process for debating the right mix (Gordy 2006) 
has been continually renewed in Cuba at times of political and economic importance,25 
and is being forged anew under new president Raúl Castro.  Sociologist Linda Fuller 
(1992) believes that this process was the result of the “institution and consolidation of 
socialism in Cuba” and that it explains in part how workplace democracy became an 
important part of the state’s response to economic crisis. 
C. Socialist Transformation 
The socialist principles of the economic management system that emerged 
following the Great Debate were codified in the 1976 Constitution of the Republic of 
Cuba (República de Cuba 2002), in which Cuba first officially declared itself a 
socialist state.  Making the worker responsible for efficiency and productivity, it 
provides for the economic system to be based on the social ownership of the means of 
production (Alexander 2002), and all relevant actors are presumed to work together 
for the same collective goals (Fuller 1992).  In the Cuban political economy, 
institutions are formed to assist the actors in attaining these collective goals.   Thus, 
through what Cubans refer to as “socialist legality,” Cuban actors and institutions are 
obligated to serve dual purposes of regulation and transformation of society (Evenson 
2003). 
From the Great Debate of 1963-1965 to the contemporary debate being held at 
the time of this thesis, a pattern of economic policy emerges in which the state 
                                                
25 Katherine Gordy (2006) notes that the debate reemerged in the 1970s with respect to 
the state’s 10-million ton sugar drive, later when implementing the Soviet economic 
model, and again in the late 80s with the state’s “Rectification Campaign of 
Ideological Errors and Negative Tendencies,” which is discussed in a later section of 
this thesis. 
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initiated periods of economic reform that shift back and forth from market 
liberalization to recentralization.  This section draws from Helen Yaffe’s (2009) 
description of the “Guevarista Pendulum” used to refer to the variability in economic 
policy between “what is desirable and what is necessary” for Cuban socialism.  The 
swings are a result of the process of negotiation between the actors in the Cuban 
system, with the goal of securing consensus at each stage.   Each swing represents a 
period of market liberalization followed by a reversal of reforms in favor of political 
and social concerns. 26 
Sovietization: 1976-1985 
This period marks a shift toward market liberalization.  From the 1970s 
through the 1980s, the Soviet Union granted Cuba subsidies in the form of well-
below-market pricing for petroleum, as well as preferential trade arrangements 
(Zimbalist 1988).  Economists estimate that subsidization of Cuba represented 23 to 
26 percent of Cuba’s national income at that time (Ritter 2004).  With the subsidies 
came increased Soviet influence on Cuban political economy, leading to the adoption 
in 1976 of the Soviet-style economic management system that had been previously 
rejected under Ché Guevara (Yaffe 2009). 
Under Soviet economic influence, from 1971 through 1985, the Cuban state 
showed its first signs of movement toward market liberalization with the legalization 
                                                
26 Yaffe’s (2009) periods do not directly line up with those used in this thesis, but they 
are not in conflict.  It is noted that she characterizes the swings as “away” and 
“towards” Ché Guevara’s BFS system, while I describe them as swings to and away 
from market liberalization.  In that way our swings are reversed.  Yaffe’s periods, 
according to her nomenclature, are: 1970s (swing away); 1986 (swing toward); 1991 
(swing away); 2000 (swing towards). 
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of peasant markets, limited introduction of self-employment and foreign-investment 
possibilities, and some decentralization measures (Ritter 2004).  Some scholars have 
suggested that these measures led to the best economic growth under the revolutionary 
government until that date (Mesa-Lago 2004).  Others have suggested that the Cuban 
economic model was inhibited by a lack of diversity in exports, still highly dependent 
on agricultural products (Pollitt 2004; Ritter 2004).  In any event, the liberalization 
reforms were short-lived.  After living conditions improved for the Cuban population 
under the measures, the leadership desired to retreat from Soviet-style market 
liberalization and return to “some dear revolutionary institutions” (Mesa-Lago 2004). 
Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies: 1986-1990 
The “Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies” is the name of the 
period beginning in 1986, shortly after Soviet restructuring under Gorbachev (Mujal-
León and Busby 2001).  This period is generally thought to represent a move away 
from the Soviet model (Yaffe 2009), which meant a reversal of market liberalization 
policies.  The Soviet perestroika had led to changes in Cuban-Soviet relations, most 
importantly the reduction in grants and favorable prices (Mujal-León and Busby 
2001).  During this period, the Cuban state initiated a rectification process to reverse 
growing inequality, halt threats to the revolutionary pride and enthusiasm and prevent 
political instability (Mesa-Lago 2004), suggesting that the state’s political legitimacy 
was based in part in the social provisions of Cuban socialism.  Consequently, it 
reversed reforms it had made during the “sovietization” period and initiated a 
recentralization of major economic decision-making (Gómez 2001), closed farmers’ 
markets and placed restrictions on private manufacturing (Pérez-López 1992).  It also 
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banned private manufacturers and street vendors (Jeffries 2001) and reinstituted moral 
incentives for workers (Yaffe 2009).  The reversal of economic reform during this 
period has been characterized as “anti-market,” “idealistic,” and the cause of an 
economic recession to be compounded by the impending democratization of the Soviet 
Union (Mesa-Lago 2004). 
Special Period in the Time of Peace: 1990-Present 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s resulted in the loss of 
subsidies from Cuba’s most important trading partner, a 30 percent drop in GDP 
between 1990 and 1993, and the collapse of three-quarters of its international trade 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a).  An economic crisis of such magnitude led to 
emergency measures in Cuba, the most debated being the economic restructuring 
which occurred during the era known as the “Special Period.”27 
Shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Cuba enacted a series of 
market liberalization policies.  Much academic and political attention has been 
devoted to the Special Period reform process, sparking a debate over the nature of the 
reforms and what they signal.  Some scholars view the reforms as a signal of an 
inevitable transition to capitalist free-market economy (ASCE 1991-2008; Snodgrass 
2001; Jatar-Hausmann 1996; Montaner 1990), while others assert that the reforms are 
but necessary adjustments in the continuation of socialist transformation (Ludlam 
2009; Gordy 2006).  Though no consensus exists on the nature of the transition, there 
                                                
27 It is generally accepted that the Special Period commenced in 1990, though whether 
the Special Period has ended is the subject of debate both within and outside of Cuba.  
For the purposes of this thesis, and to capture all relevant reforms related to those at 
the onset of the Special Period, I will treat it as continuing to date.  This is not meant 
as a political judgment of any kind. 
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is general agreement that the policies were driven by a sudden, involuntary exogenous 
shock (Fernandes 2003)  from the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and enacted 
mostly in response to “the deteriorating international economic environment”  (Mesa-
Lago 2007; Pérez Villanueva 2002; Pérez-López 1992).  To meet the daunting 
economic crisis, Cuba considered new economic solutions to replace the international 
support it had loss (Evenson 2003). 
Specifically, the state modified its development strategy through institutional 
and policy changes, which included the legalization of the U.S. dollar, self-
employment, foreign direct investment, agricultural worker cooperatives, the 
decentralization and reorganization of the state enterprise and flexibilization.28  Most 
of these economic reforms were in place by 1996 (Ritter 2004; Amaro 1998).  What 
follows is a description of the major reforms and what is known or suspected about 
their impact. 
1. Dollarization29 
The 1993 reforms included Law-Decree 140, which legalized the possession of 
the U.S. dollar (Gordy 2006).  The motivation behind the law was to alleviate the need 
to have police and the courts devote time to fighting the illegal attainment of scarce 
goods on the black market (Gordy 2006).  The dollar sector consists of specialty shops 
and the tourist sector, and sales by local suppliers in the dollar economy have steadily 
                                                
28 Other reforms included the limited establishment of export processing zones, 
banking reforms and privatization (Ritter 2004). 
29 In November 2004, the U.S. dollar was again removed from circulation in favor of 
the Cuban Convertible Peso (“CUC”) (Gordy 2006).  However, there remain dual 
currencies establishing dual economies on the island- one for those with access to 
convertible currency and one for those who rely solely on national currency. 
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increased since dollarization from 25 percent of total sales in 1996 to 61 percent in 
2000 (Brundenius 2009). 
The dollarization policy essentially created a dual economy that has been tied 
to growing inequality and potential class divisions among Cuban workers.  
Specifically, Cubans with access to this “hard” currency (usually those with family in 
the United States and those exposed to the tourist sector) are able to purchase scarce 
goods in stores that only accept dollar currency, while those Cubans who rely solely 
on state salaries paid in moneda nacional cannot (Gordy 2006).  Consequently, this 
policy has been described as causing a “severe division in a society that was 
previously egalitarian” (Gordy 2004).   Although most scholars acknowledge that one 
of the effects of the policy is that workers in state enterprises make less than those 
paid in dollars (Ritter and Rowe 2002), the significance and extent of class division as 
a result of the policy is unknown.  However, some scholars have contributed race-
based effects to the policy.  “With increased reliance on dollars and fewer relatives 
from abroad from whom they can receive them, Afro-Cubans have found themselves 
forced to participate in the more illegal aspects of the black market, prostitution and 
petty theft” (Gordy 2004). 
2. Self-Employment 
Law-Decree 141 legalized self-employment in at least 117 occupations (Gordy 
2006).30  The state considered the policy to be necessary for increasing the production 
                                                
30 Pérez-Villanueva (1998) reports that self-employment regulation at that time 
allowed 140 occupations.  On September 24, 2010, the official party newspaper, 
Granma, published an article saying that the new “reorientation” process will allow 
licenses in 178 categories.  However, in an interview on November 25, 2010, 
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of goods and creating jobs (Pérez-Villanueva 1998).  The text of the law established 
that the practice would be heavily monitored in order to prevent “the values of 
entrepreneurship from contaminating those values and practices fostered by socialism” 
(Gordy 2006).31   Shortly before the self-employment law was enacted, approximately 
95 percent of Cubans were formally employed in the state sector, while only 3.3 
percent were working formally in the non-state sector (Gómez 2001).  As of 2009, 
approximately 78 percent of the labor force was employed by the state and 22 percent 
in the non-state sector,32 not including those working informally. 
3. Agricultural Worker Cooperatives 
UBPCs are financially autonomous from the state, elect their own 
management, with earnings based on collective performance (Jeffries 2001).  Land 
transferred to UBPCs is still owned by the state, though some of it can be set aside for 
private consumption by the cooperative (Jeffries 2001).  The state transfers ownership 
of the equipment and the plant to the cooperative (Jeffries 2001).  Although the state 
continues to centrally decide prices and production quotas (Corrales 2004), the 
cooperatives are granted the right to sell any production above state quotas to third 
parties (Jeffries 2001).  Because production decisions are made by the state enterprise 
and subject to state planning (Jeffries 2001), some scholars claim that UBPCs lack 
                                                                                                                                       
Professor Digna Pérez, a professor at the Lázaro Peña national trade union school in 
Havana, informed the author of this thesis that the number has been increased to 183. 
31 According to the September 24, 2010 issue of Granma, in the contemporary 
liberalization, the state will remove most of the heavy restrictions for receiving 
licenses for self-employment in its efforts to “reorient” over a million workers from 
the state sector to non-state work, including self-employment. 
32 Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html (Accessed 
September 5, 2010). 
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autonomy (Mesa-Lago 2007).  However others acknowledge that UBPCs have 
increased the space for both participation and for managerial autonomy of the 
collective (Pérez Rojas and Echevarría León 2001). 
4. Foreign Direct Investment 
Under Law-Decree 50, enacted in 1982, foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in 
most sectors of the Cuban economy had been prohibited (Gordy 2006), except for 
heavily restricted joint ownership between state-owned enterprises and foreign 
investors (Suchlicki and Jorge 1994).  The first foreign project was not completed 
until 1990, and FDI grew slowly until the brunt of the Special Period crisis in 1992 
(Travieso-Diaz and Trumbull 2003).  By 1992, the economic crisis was so severe that 
even the Cuban communist party favored greater promotion of foreign investment, at 
least in projects that would contribute to the achievement of national development 
plans (Travieso-Diaz and Trumbull 2003). 
Subsequently, in 1994, the state made an important change to the 1976 
constitution with respect to property rights, providing specific authorization for 
foreign ownership (Suchlicki and Jorge 1994).  In 1995, the state replaced Law-
Decree 50 with Law-Decree 77, permitting foreign investment in most sectors, with 
the exception of education, health, and the armed forces (Gordy 2006; Travieso-Diaz 
and Trumbull 2003; Jeffries 2001).  The new law established three permissible types 
of FDI: joint ventures, international economic associations and companies with totally 
foreign capital (Travieso-Diaz and Trumbull 2003).  This would be the first occasion 
following the revolution when up to 100 percent foreign ownership was possible 
(Corrales 2004). 
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The text of the law sets forth the state’s position that foreign investment was 
the only way that Cuba could preserve the achievements of the revolution in the 
context of global economic pressure (Gordy 2006).  This is a frame for national debate 
over the political economy that the state has consistently employed in times of market 
liberalization as well as in periods of retreat.  Some scholars have posited that the 
state’s underlying reasons for the escalation in FDI in the 1990s were that it 
considered FDI necessary to help domestic companies meet international quality 
standards, and that FDI was essential for jumpstarting the economy and inserting Cuba 
into the global economy (Pérez Villanueva 2002).  Another reason suggested for the 
allowance of FDI was to support the broader development strategy of import 
substitution  (Pérez Villanueva 2002).   
Although there is general agreement that this was a significant market 
liberalization policy, there were some signs that the policy was designed to be limited.   
The law allows foreign investors to provide capital, technical resources and 
managerial skill (Travieso-Diaz and Trumbull 2003), but requires all FDI enterprises 
to hire workers from a state-provided and maintained list (Corrales 2004).  In addition, 
the state maintains control over labor relations by selecting, hiring, promoting, 
dismissing and paying all Cuban employees in joint ventures (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2009a; Pérez-López 2005).  Further, any investment resulting in direct competition 
with domestic industries is prohibited (Pérez-López 2005; Travieso-Trumbull 2003; 
Jeffries 2001), and the state normally holds a majority of shares (Pérez-López 2005).  
As recently as 1999, Cuban officials declared that foreign investment partners would 
be selected by the state for only those projects that are “really justified” (Pérez-López 
 35 
2005) in areas of economy that it seeks to grow, and heavy restrictions and controls 
have always existed on the presence of FDI on the island (Pérez Villanueva 2002).   
Further, authorization is often approved by the state for a limited period of time, with 
revocations of prior approvals being a common occurrence (Pérez-López 2005). 
An example of one of biggest hindrances faced by potential foreign investors is 
that the president of Cuba sits on the committee that grants ultimate approval to: 
investments of total value (including the Cuban contribution) exceeding $10 million 
USD, 100-percent foreign-owned enterprises, investments in public works or 
involving natural resources, investments requiring the conveyance of state property, 
and any investments involving a business owned by the state armed forces (Travieso-
Diaz and Trumbull 2003).  Another hindrance on FDI is the requirement to invest in 
other areas for the state’s development plans.  For example, foreign investment in the 
biggest tourist destinations generally requires the investor to invest in other areas of 
the country so that the state can avoid concentrating the effects of FDI in any one 
particular area (Pérez Villanueva 2002). 
Currently, the largest foreign investors are from Spain, Canada, Italy and 
France- mostly in the sectors of basic industry, tourism and construction (Travieso and 
Trumbull 2003).  However, 75 percent of all investment has been limited to less than 
$5 million USD per investment project, a result that has been attributed to the heavy 
restrictions on FDI (Travieso and Trumbull 2003).  Between 1988 and 2000, more 
than 530 joint ventures were formed in Cuba, but only 392 of those were still active by 
the end of 2000 (Pérez Villanueva 2002).  In 2002, FDI in Cuba amounted to only 
$100 million USD, which is just 5 percent of FDI in Vietnam (Mesa-Lago 2007).  To 
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make this distinction in policy between the countries more clear, in 1997 Vietnam, a 
country that commenced FDI liberalization at roughly the same time, was able to bring 
in $2 billion due to favorable FDI laws that gave FDI a protected and foreseeable 
structure.  Meanwhile declining FDI in Cuba has been attributed to a lack of 
inducements, as well as government restrictions and the revocation of contracts 
(Mesa-Lago 2007, Travieso-Diaz and Trumbull 2003).33 
5. Decentralization and Restructuring of State Enterprises 
Carmona (2004) regards the 1997 decentralization and managerial 
restructuring of state enterprises, a policy known as Sistema de perfeccionamiento 
empresarial (“SPE”) as Cuba’s most radical Special Period market reform. The policy 
was implemented to improve profitability, efficiency and quality while also reducing 
bureaucracy (Mesa-Lago 2007).  However the process is not entirely free from central 
control.  Enterprise management in participating enterprises is allowed to develop its 
own economic and production plans (Peters 2001).  The relevant ministry of the sector 
in which the business operates controls entrance of a state-owned enterprise into the 
SPE program.  Once an enterprise is selected, the ministry conducts a financial audit 
and requires the enterprise to develop, in consultation with the union and workers, a 
business plan for final approval prior to implementation or registration in the program 
(Peters 2001). 
                                                
33 As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the differences in approach to and use 
of FDI is deemed critical by some scholars as an explanation of the stability of one-
party regimes during market liberalization (Gallagher 2007), making the consequences 
of Cuba’s limited approach an important feature in terms of comparative study. 
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Some have billed the state enterprise reform as the enabling of enterprise 
managers to “conduct business as if the Cuban economy was based on private, market 
capitalism” (Carmona 2004).  However, in practice its use appears to be somewhat 
limited.  The SPE program began in earnest in 1998, with 98 applicants.  By 2000 
there were 1412 total applicants, only 19 of which had received final approval of their 
business plans by the central government.  By 2001, 244 enterprises had received final 
approval, 34 but by 2002 only 409 out of 3000 total applicants (13.6 percent) had 
received final approval from the central government and were up and running 
(Marquetti in Pérez Villanueva 2004), and as of 2009, the central government retains 
the ability to determine production plans for all state enterprises regardless of 
participation in the SPE program (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a). 
6. Flexibilization 
The final major Special Period market reform was the introduction of 
flexibilization.  There is not much research regarding the specifics of labor market 
flexibility in Cuba.  However, the SPE program described in the previous paragraphs 
grants the enterprise manager certain types of internal and external labor flexibility, 
including the right to hire workers (through a state agency), the right to develop a 
compensation plan based on pay-for-performance, and freedom from national 
regulations regarding experience qualifications.  Changes to numerical external 
flexibility include the right to hire employees on short-term contracts, and changes to 
                                                
34 All data is from Philip Peters’ State Enterprise Reform in Cuba: An Early Snapshot. 
Arlington, VA: The Lexington Institute. (2001). 
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numerical internal flexibility extended the rights of the SPE manager to create 
working time arrangements (Peters 2001). 
As discussed more fully in the next section, flexibilization in Cuba is limited 
by national institutions, which require worker and union participation at each step of 
the process (Peter 2001).  Zimbalist and Eckstein (1987) found that flexibilization was 
implemented subject to extensive worker participation, allowing worker and union 
involvement in production decision-making.  In addition to the participatory 
institutions, some aspects of internal flexibility, including pay schemes and internal 
labor markets, remain under the control of the state and are regulated by national 
institutions such as labor legislation and the state constitution (Pérez-López 2005), 
which provide social security benefits including salary and retraining during 
unemployment. 
D. Impact of the Special Period Reforms 
Whether the Special Period liberalization policies were considered a success or 
not appears to depend on whether the analyst is measuring success by GDP, political 
transition, or social impact.  Case in point, the Special Period reforms have been 
referred to by some commentators as “capitalist reforms” “in response to popular 
pressure” (Snodgrass 2001), “major adjustments (Mujal-León 2009) representing 
“Castro’s last stand” (Montaner 1990) and the revolutionary government’s strategy for 
“survival” (Mujal-León 2009).  Other scholars characterize the changes more 
modestly as limited to economic policy, rather than implying political transition with 
economic transition.  For example, Katherine Gordy (2006), suggests that “[t]he texts 
of these laws made clear that they were not decisions reflecting shifts in the ideology 
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of the Cuban people or in the nature of the system as a whole but policy responses to 
changes in the global economy and, to a lesser extent, people’s behavior.”  Steve 
Ludlam (2009) asserts that the reforms represented Cuba’s hope to morph into a new 
form of socialism capable of safeguarding its fundamental principles while at the same 
time increasing productivity and efficiency.  Indeed, Carlos Lage, Vice-President of 
the Council of State had stated in 1994, “We will make reforms, but only to save 
socialism.”35 
In terms of the economy, the Special Period reforms stimulated modest growth 
(Snodgrass 2001), and led to a decrease in budget deficit from 33.5 percent of GDP in 
1993 to 1.9 percent in 1997 (Gómez 2001).  GDP growth resumed in 1994 due to 
improvements mainly in the agricultural and tourism sectors, and was very positive 
between 1996 and 1999 (Jeffries 2001).  Katherine Gordy (2006) found: 
“With the important economic changes, the government 
has been able to weather the 1990s with the majority of 
the revolution’s achievements intact.  Even according to 
the World Bank’s 2001 edition of the Word 
Development Indicators (WDI), Cuba has not only 
maintained the revolution’s achievements in low infant 
mortality rates, primary education and health care, but 
improved them despite the presence of the U.S. trade 
embargo and the collapse of the Soviet trading 
Block…Much of this has to do with high levels of 
public spending” (Gordy 2004). 
 
As will be discussed in more detail in the section on Cuban industrial relations, 
the Special Period economic reforms also had a direct impact on the industrial 
relations system, leading to an overhaul of the national labor code in 2005 (Ludlam 
                                                
35 El País, June 19, 1994. 
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2009) and a refocus on the role of collective bargaining and human resource systems 
during the period described below as “The Battle of Ideas.” 
Battle of Ideas,36 Raúl’s New Great Debate and the “Vietnamese Solution” 37 
The period marking the “Battle of Ideas” in Cuba saw a retreat from market 
liberalization and a reversal of market mechanisms introduced during the Special 
Period.  Yaffe (2009) describes the period as one of “political regeneration,” and 
claims that state investment in infrastructure and social programs during this period 
was “to reverse the marginalization and inequalities provoked during the previous 
decade.”  Reversals included the reduction of joint ventures by 41 percent from 2002-
2006 (Mesa-Lago 2007).  Specifically, Cuba went from 403 joint ventures in 2002 to 
just 236 in 2006, accounting for less than 1 percent of employment (Yaffe 2009).  
Another reversal occurred in 2003, when managers in state enterprises participating in 
the decentralized SPE program were required to obtain approval from the central bank 
for purchases as low as $5000 USD (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a).  This 
recentralization of decision-making and retraction from market liberalization has been 
justified by the state as a protocol needed to control corruption, rectify inequalities and 
                                                
36 The Battle of Ideas is often thought to have commenced in 2005 (Yaffe 2009); 
however, retreat from market liberalization appears to have started as early as 2002, as 
evident from empirical information presented in this section.   
37 As of the time of the writing of this thesis, Cuba has entered a new phase of market 
liberalization, which was announced in August 2010.  The internal debate over this 
issue began in 2007, a new phase of which is occurring simultaneously with the 
submission of this project.  However, data is currently being collected for use in my 
resulting doctoral thesis.  I note that this recent shift toward market liberalization, as of 
this moment mostly in the form of reduction of state employment, does not alter the 
main argument of this thesis. 
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re-energize revolutionary morale (Mesa-Lago 2007) by returning to the building of 
class consciousness (Yaffe 2009). 
In 2007, the Cuban state commenced a debate with Cuban workers over the 
future construction of Cuban socialism.  Helen Yaffe (2009) suggests that the 2007 
mass consultations38 were initiated by the state in order for workers to “contribute to a 
new Great Debate about Cuba’s socioeconomic problems.”  Approximately 1.3 
million complaints and proposals were collected and reviewed (Yaffe 2009). 
This process of mass consultation, was followed by an August 2010 
announcement of a new round of market liberalization reforms that will likely have a 
direct impact on workers.  Some commentators have referred to this new shift in 
Cuban economic policy as the “Vietnamese Solution,” apparently referring to 
economic reform absent political change (Castañeda 2008).  As part of the reforms an 
official announcement has already been made of the “reorientation”39 of over 1 million 
redundant workers in the public administration sector, who are to be shifted mostly to 
self-employment (Weissert 2010).  Other reforms are expected to include another stab 
at decentralization of decision-making to the enterprise (Weissert 2010). Although 
writers have referred to these newly announced changes as “significant steps in a 
country where the state dominates nearly every facet of the economy” (Weissert 
2010), they are not unlike the reforms implemented during the early stages of the 
                                                
38 Mass consultations are one of several participatory processes in the Cuban political 
and industrial relations system.  These are discussed in more detail in the section on 
the Cuban industrial relations system appearing later in this chapter. 
39 In the September 19, 2010 issue of Granma, there were at least four different words 
used to describe the industrial relations changes in the new economic model, 
including: reajuste (readjustment), rediminsionamiento (redimensioning), 
reordenamiento (to put back in order), transformación (transformation). 
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Special Period.  Marino Munillo, a high-level economic official, referred to the 
changes as a “modification of the Cuba economic model,” but stated that “the values 
of socialism come first, not the market” and “[w]e will continue following centralized 
planning, but we will loosen up on a group of things.” (Weissert 2010). 
In summary, the Cuban socialist political economy has been in constant motion 
toward and away from market liberalization since almost its inception.  Although there 
has been debate among academics as to the meaning of these market swings, there is 
almost universal agreement that they represent limited liberalization, particularly in 
comparison with market liberalization policies in other contexts, including the 
simultaneous political and economic liberalization in Latin America and the post-
socialist cases, as well as those in China and Vietnam- countries who, like Cuba, have 
maintained a single-party political system, but who, unlike Cuba, have not swung 
away from the market liberalization that has grown their economies.40  In addition, 
Cuba’s history of increasing worker participation during market liberalization and 
economic crisis pre-dates its official socialist declaration, starting with the Great 
Debate in the early 1960s, and renewing continually at critical economic junctures.  
Although the 2010 reforms that are occurring at this moment have been billed as the 
“Vietnam Solution,” the liberalization policies appear to be of the same nature as in 
previous swings toward market liberalization, though the extent of the reforms is yet 
to be seen. 
                                                
40 These comparative transitions are discussed in more detail Chapter 3. 
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In the next section I describe the Cuban industrial relations system and its 
institutions, followed by a discussion of the impact of market liberalization on the 
industrial relations system and workers. 
National Institutions and the Industrial Relations System 
The Cuban socialist system is formed by its national institutions, which give 
structure to the participatory process that is the subject of this thesis.  Although Cuba 
is not a pluralistic political democracy, the following section details the mechanisms 
of its workplace democracy institutions and the popular participation of workers in 
matters of political economy.  First I discuss the political system and actors, then the 
complementary institutions, followed by a description of the process providing for 
worker participation in matters of both political economy and production.  This section 
concludes with a discussion of what we know about the impact of market 
liberalization on the Cuban industrial relations system and worker participation. 
A. The Cuban State and the Political System 
Cuba currently has 14 provinces representing 169 municipalities (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2010), with legislative assemblies at the municipal, provincial 
and national levels.  Article 69 of the constitution describes the National Assembly of 
People’s Power as “the supreme body of state power” that “represents and expresses 
the sovereign will of all the people” (República de Cuba 2002).  Fifty percent of the 
representatives to all levels of Cuban legislative assemblies are directly elected by 
secret ballot (Evenson 2003).  The remaining fifty percent of all assemblies, including 
the National Assembly, are selected by the several official mass organizations, 
including the central trade union federation, the women’s federation, neighborhood 
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organizations, farmers’ organizations, university students and the armed forces 
(National Lawyers Guild 2002).  There are no direct elections for the national 
president; However, Article 74 of the constitution (República de Cuba 2002) provides 
for indirect election of the President of the Republic of Cuba through direct election 
by the National Assembly (Central Intelligence Agency 2010).   The role of popular 
participation was expanded during the Special Period through a 1992 constitutional 
amendment that permitted citizens to directly elect the National and Provincial 
Assemblies.41 
B. The Communist Party 
Traditional communist states provide that the communist party has a leading 
role in society.  The Communist Party of Cuba (“Partido Comunista de Cuba” or 
“PCC”), like the communist parties in the Soviet Union (Kramer 2003) and China (Li 
2004) does not deviate from this basic structure.  The PCC is established by Article 5 
of the constitution as the “highest guiding force of society and the State, which 
organizes and guides common efforts toward the goal of constructive socialism and 
the advance toward a communist society” (República de of Cuba 2002).  
Approximately one million Cuban citizens are estimated to be members of the 
communist party (National Lawyers Guild 2002).  Cuban officials have explained that 
the PCC’s roles include uniting the interests of the trade unions and the state, 
increasing economic productivity, and the political and ideological oversight of the 
enterprise (National Lawyers Guild 2001).  As such, it publishes the official 
newspaper on the island, Granma, which communicates correspondence of both the 
                                                
41 República de Cuba (as modified on July 7, 1992), Arts. 71, 135. 
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state and the unions,42 as well as national news and cultural events.  Debra Evenson 
(2003), scholar of the Cuban legal system, finds that although the PCC does not 
govern, administer or legislate, there is an intimate and mutually dependent 
relationship between the communist party, the state and the unions. 
C. Mass Organizations 
The 1976 constitution officially recognizes and authorizes several mass 
organizations, including the central trade union federation, Central de Trabajadores 
de Cuba (“CTC”) (Evenson 2003).  Although the 1976 Cuban constitution was 
adapted from that of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, Evenson (2003) 
argues that one of the reasons it remained uniquely Cuban is because it “reflected 
extraordinary national character and contained important innovations not found in its 
models, such as constitutional recognition of, and grant of authority to, national social 
organizations, least of not which was the national union.”  These mass social 
organizations have the constitutional right to propose legislation through their elected 
representatives, participate directly in the decision-making bodies at all levels 
(municipal, provincial and national) of governance and approve any legislative 
proposals affecting workers (Ludlam 2009; República de Cuba 2002). 
Scholars have used the phrase “democratic centralism” to describe the Cuban 
system of communist party oversight of the mass organizations through which Cubans 
participate in creating socialism (Rosendahl 1997).  It should be noted that there are 
some scholars that have questioned whether official mass organizations in Cuba are 
independent forums for political participation (Fernandes 2003), though this is a 
                                                
42 The union also publishes its own weekly newspaper, Trabajadores. 
 46 
common concern of commentators suspicious of the dual roles played by unions and 
other worker organizations in most one-party communist systems (Evenson 2003), 
including China (Kong 2006; Xiaoyang and Chan 2005) and Vietnam (Kong 2006).  
However, Dilla (2009) adds that the CTC and other mass organizations have begun to 
show “critical distance” from the state by creating new roles since the Special Period 
(Fernandes 2004; Fuller 1985). 
Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (“CTC”) 
The CTC was created in 1939, twenty years prior to the most recent Cuban 
revolution, as a central organization of the twenty national unions43 (Alexander 2002).  
However, the CTC has transformed since its pre-revolutionary form.   Its relationship 
with the Batista dictatorship immediately prior to the revolution has been described as 
volatile and compromising (Alexander 2002).  The CTC was also not favored by Fidel 
Castro’s July 26th Movement because it failed to support the revolution until it after 
victory was secured (Alexander 2002).  Upon the successful overthrow of the Batista 
administration, the new revolutionary government replaced the leaders of the CTC 
with members of the July 26th Movement and other supporters from the political 
parties that supported the revolution (Alexander 2002). 
The CTC is the only constitutionally recognized trade union federation 
(Evenson 2003), although formal authorization from the state is not necessary to create 
a labor organization in Cuba (National Lawyers Guild 2002).  The CTC is obligated to 
share and adhere to the goals and policies of the Cuban communist party (República 
de of Cuba 2002), and as mentioned previously, in addition to its close relationship 
                                                
43 A complete list of the national trade unions can be found in Appendix C. 
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with workers, it also shares a close relationship with the state and party.  For example, 
it is not unusual for its leaders to simultaneously hold high-level state government 
posts (Evenson 2003; National Lawyers Guild 2001), and at least one scholar has 
noted that there appears to be some communist party influence in the election of 
provincial and national officers (Evenson 2003).  However, Evenson (2003) asserts 
that without the right to dues check-off or union security, the CTC remains financially 
autonomous, and has been found to maintain a separate role in the industrial relations 
system, at least since the 1970s (Fuller 1992).  The CTC is independent from state 
subsidy and union membership is voluntary.   Dues average about 1 percent of wages, 
which the union must collect on its own accord (Evenson 2003). 
The CTC, as a constitutionally recognized mass organization for workers, has 
the power to propose legislation at the municipal, provincial and national levels.44  In 
addition to representation in the National Assembly, the CTC, like other mass 
organizations, is permanently represented in Cuba’s Council of State (República de 
Cuba 2002), a 31-member legislative body, which includes the President of Cuba  
(Central Intelligence Agency 2010).  CTC leaders are elected at the CTC Congress, 
scheduled to be held every 5 years (Evenson 2003). 
In addition to its role in the participatory processes discussed later in this 
section, the CTC also serves as a cultural hub for worker social events by providing 
union members with access to sports and leisure activities for very nominal fees 
(National Lawyers Guild 2007).   The CTC also has a history of maintaining a role in 
                                                44	  Article 88 of the constitution endows the CTC with the power to propose laws 
(República de Cuba 2002).	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enterprise productivity.  For example, in 1976, the Secretary General of the CTC 
officially created the National Association of Innovators and Inventors (“ANIR”) to 
provide technical assistance to all economic sectors of the country (Camnitzer 2003).  
The organization was founded in honor of Ché Guevara and the groups he organized 
and is comprised of groups of technical experts and academics with the duty of 
solving problems related to scarcity of resources through innovation (Camnitzer 
2003). 
National Trade Unions 
The CTC functions in a fashion similar to that of the AFL-CIO in the United 
States.  It is currently comprised of 20 national unions, representing approximately 98 
percent of Cuban workers (Evenson 2003).  The national trade unions are organized 
by sector and structured so that one national union has jurisdiction over all of the 
workers in a particular industry, regardless of classification or craft (National Lawyers 
Guild 2002).45 All but two of the national unions, The Union of Hotel and Tourism 
Workers and the Union of Science Workers, have been existence for approximately 
twenty years or more (National Lawyers Guild 2002). 
Trade unions are structured at grass roots (local), municipal, provincial and 
national levels corresponding to the CTC’s structure.46  The lowest level of union 
organization is the section (sección), which is often organized within departments or 
shops (Evenson 2003) at the workplace and sub-workplace level.  The rank and file 
elects all section leaders directly by secret ballot every 2 ½ years (Evenson 2003).  
                                                
45 A full list of the 20 national trade unions can be found in Appendix C. 
46 An organization chart of CTC and national unions can be found in Appendix D.
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Also on the local level, each enterprise generally, though not always, has its own local 
organization, known as a bureau (buró), which is equivalent to union locals in the 
United States (National Lawyers Guild 2008).  Bureau leaders are professional union 
staff paid by the union, and they are responsible for negotiating collective bargaining 
agreements and handling disciplinary matters for workers (Evenson 2003).  They, too, 
are elected every 2 ½ years by secret ballot by members of the various sections 
(Evenson 2003).  In addition to section and bureau union officers, shop stewards serve 
at the enterprise level and are elected directly by the rank and file at the shop in which 
they work. 
D. Complementary Institutions 
Labor rights are embedded structurally in the constitution, the national labor 
code and in complementary legislation (Martínez-Navarro 2009).  Labor and social 
security are treated by the state as one concern and come under one agency.  The 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security  (“Ministry”) oversees the Institute for Labor 
Relations and Studies, the Institute of Labor Rights and Studies, the CTC and its trade 
unions, and the treatment of human and financial resources (Ministerio de Trabajo y 
Seguridad Social 2010). The most recent national labor code was constructed in 2000 
(Evenson 2003), and a major revision was commenced in 2005.  That revision is 
currently in its 26th draft as of 2009 (Martínez-Navarro 2009), without yet being 
codified.47 
National Pay Scale 
                                                
47 The last known codification of the Labor Code was in 1984 (LWBUL 2009). 
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The Ministry sets the national pay scale with input from the CTC (National 
Lawyers Guild 2004; 2001).  In a 2008 meeting,48 the Secretary General of the CTC at 
that time, Salvador Valdez, stated that the salary scales are divided into 22 groups, 
with the minimum wage set at 225 Cuban pesos/month (approximately $10 
USD/month) and the top salary for leaders set at 750 pesos/month (approximately $34 
USD/month) (National Lawyers Guild 2008).  The average Cuban base salary is about 
$20 USD/month.49  Valdez further explained that workers advance in pay by 30 to 40 
percent based on seniority (National Lawyers Guild 2008).  In addition to this base 
salary, bonus incentives are available for meeting individual and collective 
productivity goals, often paid in convertible currency as opposed to the national 
currency, which could lead to a doubling of the monthly salary (National Lawyers 
Guild 2008).  This is because the exchange rate between the national currency (the 
Cuban peso, “CUP”) and the convertible currency (“CUC”) is about 29 to 1.50 
Dispute Resolution 
Cubans refer to worksite conflicts as “contradictions,” which assumes that 
conflicts can be resolved “within the parameters of socialism” (Fuller 1992).   
Methods for workplace dispute resolution are set nationally under Law-Decree 176, 
passed in 1977, which established the grievance procedure (CTC 2006).  Article 5 of 
Decree-Law 176 (MTSS 1997) establishes a “Grass Roots Labor Justice Board” 
                                                
48 The author of this thesis was a member of a group of U.S. attorneys that interviewed 
the CTC officials. 
49 BBC News. “Cuba to Abandon Salary Equity.” June 12, 2008.  Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7449776.stm (Accessed on September 7, 2010). 
50 Conversion as of September 7, 2010. http://www.flightpedia.org/exchange-rate-1-
cuc-cup.html  
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(Organa de Justicia Laboral de Base, or “OJLB”), which is an enterprise-level 
grievance mechanism.  The OJLB has been described as the basic forum for resolving 
grievances on the shop floor, and it is the gateway into the court system on appeal 
from any party to the dispute (National Lawyers Guild 2001).   It has jurisdiction over 
disciplinary actions, violations of collective bargaining agreements, as well as any 
discrimination claims under Article 42 of the constitution (MTSS 1997).  The OJLB 
has three permanent members: one representative of enterprise administration, one 
union representative and one rank and file member selected by the workers (MTSS 
1997).  Hearings of the OJLB are held at the worksite and are open to the public 
(National Lawyers Guild 2001).   
Now that I have laid out the actors and the complementary institutions of the 
Cuban industrial relations system, I turn to the institutions that are the subject of this 
thesis- the Cuban workplace democracy system. 
E. Worker Participation Institutions 
From the Cuban perspective, the way to ensure that workers are owners of the 
means of production is to create structure at all levels of society to facilitate high 
levels of worker participation (Evenson 2003) through a multiplicity of forums (Fuller 
1985).  The institutions through which workers engage in popular and workplace 
participation are legally mandated (Fuller 1986), and by law, the implementation of 
any labor legislation requires prior worker and union participation (Evenson 2003) and 
worker consensus (Ludlam 2009).  It has been argued that the Cuban participatory 
institutions have no match in the Eastern European socialist countries and remain 
unmatched in most of the Western hemisphere (Evenson 2003).  However, research 
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into the full extent of Cuban worker participation has not yet been conducted (Ludlam 
2009)- a gap this thesis is meant to fill. 
In addition to representation in the national and complementary institutions 
described earlier, there are at least three mechanisms for formal worker participation: 
(1) workers’ assemblies, (2) mass consultations and (3) collective bargaining.  I 
discuss each in turn, and then describe the role of the CTC in facilitating worker 
participation. 
Workers’ Assemblies 
Workers participate in monthly meetings at their worksites during which 
enterprise managers provide business reports to workers, who in turn are allowed to 
discuss productivity, raise workplace complaints and recommend action (Evenson 
2003).  Workers’ assemblies are not only used for enterprise-level meetings to discuss 
production and services, but to debate national issues as well (Fuller 1986).  
Specifically, all proposed labor legislation must be debated in the workers’ assemblies, 
including legislative proposals from higher levels.  Such proposals are first submitted 
by the Ministry to the trade unions, which then submit the proposed legislation to the 
workers through workers’ assemblies throughout the country (Evenson 2003; National 
Lawyers Guild 2001).  For example, national unions and the Ministry work 
collaboratively to decide on national incentives.  Once agreement is met, the local 
unions meet with enterprise administration to formulate proposals for how to distribute 
the incentives.  Any proposal then must be presented to the workers in a meeting of 
the workers’ assembly for rejection or acceptance of the proposal (National Lawyers 
Guild 2005). 
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Mass Consultations 
In case of emergency political and economic issues, such as Raúl Castro’s new 
Great Debate, a constitutionally guaranteed process for public mass consultation 
(consultas públicas) is invoked, where workers in provinces throughout the island are 
gathered in their worker assemblies’ to discuss and vote on proposals (Ludlam 2009; 
República de Cuba 2002).  Steve Ludlam (2007) provides an illustrative example of a 
state proposal in the early 2000s to allow firms with foreign investment to employ 
workers without protection of the labor code.  An estimated two million workers 
participated in the workers’ assemblies throughout the island to discuss the measures.  
Ludlam reports that during a live televised meeting (apparently done to increase 
worker knowledge), the General Secretary of the CTC verbally confronted then 
President Fidel Castro for over an hour resulting in the defeat of the proposal.  
The mass consultation process is currently taking place with respect to the 
2010 labor reorientation and development a new economic model.  This process is 
particularly understudied, lacking information regarding its frequency or usage- 
another gap in empirical knowledge that I hope to fill through observation of the 
process as it is currently occurring. 
Collective Bargaining 
The requirement that every workplace have a collective bargaining agreement 
is guaranteed in complementary legislation to the Labor Code (Martínez-Navarro 
2009).  Subjects for bargaining are very broad and include such issues as the direction 
and future of the enterprise, promotion and hiring procedures, work schedules, 
distribution of incentives and even methods for tip redistribution (National Lawyers 
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Guild 2001).  The 1984 Labor Code establishes that proposed terms to a collective 
bargaining agreement may not be implemented, and have no legal force, unless and 
until they have been approved by the workers (LWBUK 2009).  Newly bargained 
collective bargaining agreements must be approved in workers assemblies with at least 
75 percent attendance before they can be implemented (Ludlam 2009; República de 
Cuba 2002). 
F. Unions and Worker Participation 
Despite being the only officially authorized labor organization, some scholars 
have found that at least since the 1980s, the CTC facilitates an environment of 
increased worker participation and union involvement (Fuller 1992; Zimbalist and 
Eckstein 1987).  Linda Fuller (1992), an expert on Cuban workplace democracy, 
found that from 1960 through 1970, the CTC served as a mere “mobilizing agent” for 
the state in economic development, and lacked interest in facilitating worker 
participation.  However, in 1970, the union began to use a variety of forums, discussed 
previously in this section, to increase worker participation with enterprise management 
and the state.  In addition, it has created a new identity for itself in the field of labor 
education. 
Labor Education 
The CTC’s role in educating its officials and the rank and file is one way the 
CTC has carved out a separate role from that of the communist party and the state 
(Fuller 1992).  In 1975, the CTC created la escuela Lázaro Peña, a national trade 
union university that educates approximately 2000 workers per year free of charge and 
is financed exclusively by the CTC (Evenson 2003).  Fuller (1992) asserts that this 
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new role makes the union the mechanism through which workers are mobilized, 
educated, organized, and coordinated to take full advantage of existing participatory 
opportunities.  She states: 
“The Cuban unions were central to workers’ 
participation in the planning process at both base and 
supraworksite levels in a number of ways.  First, the 
process created opportunities for workers to expand their 
comprehension of production and economic matters, one 
of the aspects of democratization as empowerment.  Yet 
this required of workers a certain level of general and 
technical knowledge, as well as an understanding of 
economic planning, if they were to avail themselves of 
these opportunities.  The effort the union devoted to 
these educational tasks could be the subject of a study in 
itself.” 
 
 The basic degree program offers courses in economics, management, labor 
law, international labor policy, accounting, work teams and other labor-management 
and economic topics.51  The objective of the schools is to train the more than 5100 
professional trade union officers across the country that are employed directly by the 
CTC and the more than 400,000 leaders who are also rank and file trade unionists with 
full-time jobs. (National Lawyers Guild 2008).  Matriculation at the school is free of 
cost to the students, who also receive their full salary pay from their full-time 
occupation (Hill 2008).  In addition to offering formal training through the national 
and provincial trade union schools, the CTC organizes seminars and courses for union 
members and publishes educational articles for union leaders on topics such as the 
most successful methods for soliciting worker input (Fuller 1982). 
                                                
51 From a February 2009 interview with the CTC leadership and faculty at a provincial 
branch of the Lázaro Peña school.  The interview was conducted in Spanish by the 
author of this thesis.  Interviews are noted following the bibliography. 
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In sum, although the Cuban political system is not a pluralistic democracy, it 
contains democratic features, including an electoral process that provides for direct, 
secret ballot election of union leaders and most state leadership, and indirect election 
of the president through direct election of the state’s highest legislative body.  In 
addition, formal procedures exist that allow for substantial worker control over 
production and legislative reform, which national institutions require to be debated 
with workers in their workers’ assemblies, mass consultations and collective 
bargaining processes.  For the past 40 years, unions have focused on facilitating 
worker participation, particularly through the formal and informal labor education of 
union leaders and rank and file membership in matters of political economy at the 
enterprise and in the broader economy in an effort to improve worker control.  
Although a complete picture of the full extent of worker participation in Cuba is 
unknown, at least one scholar has found the institutions to be democratic and 
increasing in effectiveness.  Particularly understudied is the impact of mass 
consultations triggered during change in political economy, a task that this thesis seeks 
to take on directly in an effort to fill the gap in existing knowledge and to examine the 
link between market liberalization and worker participation. 
In the next section I set forth the literature with respect to what is known about 
the impact of market liberalization on the workplace democracy institutions just 
discussed. 
Impact of Market Liberalization on Cuban Participatory Institutions 
Even those scholars critical of whether democracy or civil society exists in 
Cuba acknowledge that the market liberalization since the Special Period of the 1990s 
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resulted in more participation between the state and workers.  Sujatha Fernandes 
(2003) studies Cuban civil society and asserts that “ordinary Cubans” are revising 
Cuban political ideology as well as the definition of “revolution,” specifically its 
political ideals.  In her work demonstrating how Cubans participate politically through 
music and art, she states: 
“[S]ince the early nineties there has been a process of 
liberalization in Cuba.  There has been more room for 
critical debate, previously taboo topics are being 
addressed more openly and the political leadership has 
shown a greater willingness to negotiate with critics.” 
 
How this process of debate works has not been studied in terms of industrial relations 
and political economy.  It is my hope that this thesis will increase knowledge of 
process by examining the impact of market liberalization on worker participation.  
There is also a dearth of information on the impact of market liberalization on the 
Cuban industrial relations system in general, though the 2009 comments of Elio 
Valerino, then head of labor and social affairs at the CTC, suggest that the ongoing 
2005 labor reform is a result of economic restructuring: 
“Since 2005, Cuba has been trying to undo the social 
disorder that has been the consequence of the economic 
crisis of the 1990s and the measures taken to ensure the 
survival of the Revolution.  The Labor Code reform will 
be completed as the material conditions for its adoption 
are established, and after a full period of consultation 
with workers on the draft Code.  In the meantime many 
changes are taking place.”52 
 
British scholar Steve Ludlam (2009) suggests that although further study is needed, 
the 2005 labor code revisions appear to have increased worker protection in the face of 
                                                
52 Mr. Valerino was interviewed by the National Lawyers Guild in Havana, Cuba in 
February 2009.  The author of this thesis participated in that interview. 
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economic restructuring in the following ways: by extending legal rights to full-time 
training and university education without loss of salary or seniority; by clarifying the 
rights of workers on part-time, temporary and other atypical contracts and by 
reiterating the need for union and worker agreement to the implementation of the law. 
 Thus, market liberalization appears to have opened up, rather than decreased, 
the ability of “ordinary” Cubans to participate and negotiate change with the state. 
Specifically, Cuban citizens have gained the ability to engage with the state in the 
determination of the boundaries of Cuban socialism.  Although further research is 
needed, it may in fact be that labor protections have also been increased as a result of 
market liberalization. 
Summary 
The Cuban political economy has been characterized by periods of market 
liberalization and retreat for most of its post-revolutionary history.  Of particular 
interest to scholars have been the 1990s market reforms instituted after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the crippling economic crisis that followed.  Indeed, Cuban 
market reforms during that period include those that have occurred in other contexts, 
including increased self-employment, FDI liberalization, agricultural reform, 
decentralization, state-owned enterprise reform and flexibilization, including some 
uniquely Cuban ones, such as dollarization.  However, most of these reforms, 
including FDI liberalization, were enacted with heavy restrictions, a strategy that will 
be shown later to have been an important economic restructuring tool for rapid 
economic growth in the Chinese and Vietnamese market liberalizations.  In fact, not 
only did Cuba restrict a tool known to produce economic growth in countries who 
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were facing similar global crises, it abandoned the reforms that it had implemented, 
despite the fact that it was able to reduce its deficit from by over 30 percent in just 
four years.  In most cases, whether in furtherance of market liberalization on in retreat 
from it, the state, unions and party usually used the same frame for its underlying 
justification for reform: that the proposed restructuring was the only way to save 
Cuban socialism and its revolutionary gains. 
The Cuban institutions for worker participation are embedded in the structure 
of the Cuban political system and supported by laws and complementary institutions 
that provide for extensive participation by workers in matters of political economy and 
production.  Even critics of Cuban democracy have acknowledged that participation 
has increased with market liberalization, as well as the willingness of the state to 
negotiate change with workers.  Despite the close relationship between the union, 
state, party and workers, or perhaps because of it, the union has been active in 
facilitating participation of workers, not just by serving as representatives, but also 
through its important role in labor education of both union officials and workers in its 
national trade union university.  Because research into the effectiveness and full extent 
of worker participation and the process for negotiating change between the worker and 
state in the Cuban state is currently understudied, a thesis examining that very process 
during this new round of market liberalization will be very valuable to building 
knowledge not just for Cuban studies, but for its implications for understanding the 
relationship between market liberalization and participation more broadly. 
To that end, in the next chapter I review the existing literature guiding the 
study of comparative industrial relations transition in order to lay the foundation for 
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the study of the relationship between market liberalization and worker participation.  It 
is followed by a comparative chapter setting forth the market liberalizations in Latin-
American, post-socialist and Sino-Vietnamese cases, and what is known about the 
impact of economic restructuring on workers in those contexts.
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CHAPTER 3 
COMPARATIVE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRANSITION 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant existing literature guiding examination of the 
impact of market liberalization on industrial relations system transition and worker 
participation.  My purpose is to show that the Cuban case raises important questions 
concerning the importance of national participatory institutions during economic 
transition. 
Market Liberalization and Industrial Relations Transition 
The rash of political, economic and social change occurring globally since the 
1970s has been studied by industrial relations scholars in order to inform our 
understanding of how such transition impacts national industrial relations systems 
(Katz and Darbishire 2000).  Scholars have studied industrial relations transitions in 
industrialized democracies,53 post-socialist political economies,54 as well as regional 
transitions in Latin America55 and Asia.56  What has emerged from this comparative 
industrial relations scholarship is general agreement that there is a link between 
                                                
53 Thelen (2001); Katz and Darbishire (2000); Locke and Thelen (1995); Locke 
(1992). 
54 Feldmann (2006); Lane (2005); Burawoy (2001); Milenkovich (2001); Lane (2000).  
For a discussion of the effects of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union on labor relations, see Melvin Croan (1992) and 
Mitchell Orenstein (2008). 
55 Murillo (2005); Gereffi (2005); Collier and Collier (2002); Dombois and Pries 
(1994); M. Cook (2007); M. Cook (1999). 
56 Lee (2007); Tran (2007); Gallagher (2005); Xiaoyang and Chan (2005); Kuruvilla 
and Erickson (2002). 
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market liberalization and industrial relations system transition (Feldmann 2006; 
Gereffi 2005; Ost 2000).  This is due in part to the laws, institutions and practices 
controlling the relationships between workers, unions, capital and the state (Kochan, 
Katz and McKersie 1994; Dunlop 1993) that link the workplace to social, political and 
economic dynamics at the national and transnational level (Hyman 1995). 
 Locke, Piore and Kochan (1995) are among the industrial relations scholars 
that have found that similar forces acting at the global level pressure states to pursue 
comparable economic outcomes regardless of diversity in domestic institutions.  
Further, it is commonly believed that global market integration causes competitive 
environments that are the driving force of change in industrial relations systems 
(Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002).  For example, in single-party communist China, desire 
for rapid economic development led to a competition between local state leaders to 
recruit FDI in their respective regions (Gallagher 2007), while an economic opening 
after the debt crisis resulted in extensive market liberalization in newly-democratized 
Latin American countries (Collier and Collier 2002).  Scholars generally agree that 
Cuba’s Special Period market liberalization can also be attributed to global economic 
pressures after the collapse of socialism in the East (Pérez Villanueva 2002; Mesa-
Lago 2007).   This shove towards greater global integration resulted in economic and 
industrial relations changes similar to those deemed to constitute industrial relations 
system transformations in other national contexts (Gereffi 2005; Carillo 1995).  
However this strand of literature does not explain why a state would abandon market 
liberalization, particularly when economic conditions are improving and the global 
pressures still exist.  Specifically, despite economic data showing that Special Period 
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market liberalization was at least moderately successful (Snodgrass 2001), and led to a 
reduction in deficit of over 30 percent in just four years (Gómez 2001), Cuba reversed 
course and retracted market reform policies (Yaffe 2009).  Thus, if we also consider 
change in the direction away from market liberalization, there must be an explanation 
other than economic pressure for what drives industrial relations change. 
Existing literature also suggests that industrial relations system change is 
converging globally towards decentralization of bargaining and increased internal and 
external flexibility at the enterprise level  (Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002).  This 
increasing flexibility has been associated with decrease in worker participation in 
Latin America (Pozas 2003), China (Li 2004) and Vietnam (Tan 2007) but has been 
linked to increased worker participation in the Cuban case (Zimbalist and Eckstein 
1987).  Similarly, decentralization has been associated with a decrease in worker 
control in China (Li 2004) and Latin America (M. Cook 1999), but has been linked to 
substantial worker control in Cuba (Peters 2001), suggesting some domestic forces 
impact market liberalization. 
These two separate strands of literature suggest a general convergence in the 
driving forces of industrial relations change and market liberalization policies, but 
there are some explanations for variations across states. 
Comparative Institutions 
Different historical events shape countries in different ways (Collier and 
Collier 2002).  For this reason industrial relations transition requires a contextualized 
approach that takes into account the political significance of the economic challenges 
faced in each particular national context (Locke and Thelen 2005).  Such a theoretical 
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approach requires close attention to the national institutions that define and shape the 
goals and strategic interactions between actors (Locke and Thelen 1995).  Locke and 
Thelen (1995) outline a contextualized approach focusing on the identities of the 
actors and the political significance of the different political and economic challenges 
they face in their particular national context.  The identities of the actors must be 
analyzed with attention to the institutions that define and shape the goals of the actors 
and structure the strategic interactions between them (Locke and Thelen 1995). 
In adopting this approach, I must identify the particular “sticking points” of 
conflict between the actors in the Cuban system.  The authors identify several sticking 
points gleaned from study of industrial relations transformations in Europe: 
centralized wage bargaining and solidaristic wages in Sweden, (2) working time 
flexibility and wage flexibility in Germany, (3) the “scala mobile” in Italy and (4) 
reorganization of work and issues of job control in the United States (Locke and 
Thelen 1995).  Comparative scholars also have identified labor market flexibilization 
in Latin America (M. Cook 1999; Pozas 1993); economic efficiency and social 
cohesion in Eastern Europe (Orenstein 2008); worker control (Gallagher 2007; Li 
2004), wage differentiation, job security, egalitarianism, poor goods provisions (Lee 
2007) and the elimination of social welfare provisions in China (Gaochao 2004) as 
points of conflict between state and labor.  Some or none of these factors may be 
sticking points in the Cuban case, so fieldwork will be necessary to determine the 
relevant challenges faced by the actors in the Cuban context. 
Once these sources of conflict in the Cuban system are identified, a framework 
for measuring change in industrial relations system institutions must be selected.  
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Erickson and Kuruvilla (1998) tackled a troublesome conceptual issue with respect to 
how to distinguish between transformation and non-fundamental change.  Specifically, 
they suggest that in determining whether there has been transformation, researchers 
should focus on changes in the essential components of the “deep structure” of the 
economic and industrial relations systems instead of focusing on outcomes such as 
workplace practices and the organization of production.  Under this framework, the 
first undertaking is the identification of the key components of the fundamental 
structure of the system and its dynamics.  (Erickson and Kuruvilla 1998).  Field 
research will uncover additional key components of the fundamental structure of 
Cuban socialist IR, though there is general agreement that workplace democracy 
institutions are key to the fundamental structure of the socialist industrial relations 
(Fuller 1985; Evenson 2003). 
Katz, Kuruvilla and Turner (1994) established that after industrial relations 
systems are established, they are generally stable and do not change for long periods 
of time.   I argue in this thesis that Cuban socialism is stable despite market 
liberalization because a key component of its fundamental structure, worker 
participation, has remained unchanged.  However, existing literature demonstrates that 
it is important that the theoretical approach includes focus on incremental changes that 
can add up to a major discontinuity, resulting in institutional transformation (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005).  For example, Mary Gallagher (2007) showed that by 
experimenting with FDI liberalization in its non-state sector, China was able to 
gradually transform its key social welfare institutions, including social goods 
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provision, egalitarianism and worker participation through a process of slow erosion 
of its social contract with workers. 
This need to account for incremental change has been the subject of recent 
debate in the institutional literature focusing on the proper conceptualization of 
institutions and how it affects our understanding of the relationships between 
institutions and economic actors during transition (Deeg and Jackson 2010).  Similar 
to Katz, Kuruvilla and Turner (1994), Hall and Soskice (2001) originally offered a 
framework that held institutions as largely stable entities that actors may alter 
incrementally in response to global economic pressures, but are almost impervious to 
complete transformation.  However, critics of this framework question the heavy 
emphasis on institutional stability and find that it lacks the ability to account for 
institutional change (Allen 2004; Howell 2003).  Deeg and Jackson (2010) explain that 
the Hall and Soskice framework may be overly-reliant on path dependency theory, and 
suggest alternatively that institutions should be viewed not only as incentive-based 
entities that constrain the actors and their strategic choices during times of transition, 
but also as potential vehicles for “new courses of action that (incrementally) change 
those institutions.”  Specifically, they assert that: 
“actors respond to changing competitive economic 
pressures by regular experimentation with the 
institutions that govern them.  Often this 
experimentation or ‘adjustment’ reflects a process of 
stabilizing the existing institution through a minor 
modification toward new ‘ends in view.’” (Deeg and 
Jackson 2010). 
 
Accordingly, to account for incremental adjustments, Streeck and Thelen 
(2005) developed a 4-group typology of institutional change.  The categories are: (1) 
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“reproduction through adaptation,” describing minor changes used to stabilize rather 
than transform; (2) “survival and return,” describing the reemergence of an institution 
through critical junctures; (3) “breakdown and replacement,” describing the 
termination of one institution that is subsequently replaced by a new one; and (4) 
“gradual transformation,” which describes incremental changes that result in a 
fundamental transformation of an institution over a long period of time. 
The Streeck and Thelen (2005) framework does not change my argument that Cuban 
socialism has not been substantially altered by its market liberalization.  Under their 
framework, Cuban socialism during transition would likely fall into the categories of  
“reproduction through adaptation,” “survival and return,” or “gradual transformation” 
because I expect fieldwork to show that complementary participatory institutions 
mediate or negate transformation from Cuban socialism through a process that allows 
the actors to renegotiate their roles and responsibilities under socialism and to adapt 
the institution without substantially altering it.  Under this process of transition 
negotiation, the actors are able to find a consensus on the balance between market 
reform and welfare concerns, while concurrently redefining the institution of Cuban 
socialism.  In this way Cuban socialism and the industrial relations system it supports 
remain relatively stable, even if fundamental changes have occurred to key 
components of the system. 
 As described above, the institutional literature offers explanations for 
the how actors impact institutions and institutional change.  However, because I am 
not simply interested in institutional change, but also the process actors use in 
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negotiating industrial relations change, I turn now to additional literature explaining 
how actors interact during transition. 
Ideology and Strategic Action 
Burawoy (1985) suggests that industrial relations system transition cannot be 
explained without an understanding of the ideological processes governing the 
political participation of workers.  One reason is that key actors experience change and 
strategize their responses to transition through their respective ideological lenses 
(Adler 1987).  International relations scholar Emanuel Adler (1987) defines political 
ideology as the “collective understanding of individuals who, being conscious of each 
other’s roles, beliefs, expectations and purposes, offer strategies for action or solutions 
to problems that can be used to change reality.”  Each actor interprets or judges events 
and conditions then uses beliefs about the causes and effects in the political realm to 
inform their expectations of others (Lieberman 2002).  Although critical historical 
events that precipitate change may affect an actor’s belief system, ideologies generally 
evolve rather than being completely displaced (Adler 1987).  Thus, determining why 
any actor in a system behaves in a particular way during transition requires that the 
researcher understand how the actors think (Anner 2004; Sikkink 1991). 
For example, workers who had recently rejected both unionism and socialism 
in the post-socialist states were found to maintain a desire for social cohesion during 
transition, which served to restrain the strategic choices of the new democratic 
governments during the implementation of neoliberal market reform.  Orenstein 
(2008) conducted a comparative study of simultaneous political and market 
liberalization in Poland and Czechoslovakia and found that because governments were 
 69 
responsible for stringent adherence to new democratic institutions, they were forced 
by the public’s popular demands into “democratic policy alternation” between policies 
designed to increase economic efficiency and those that would provide social 
cohesion.  Despite the historic popular rejection of socialism in the region (Crowley 
and Ost 2001; Orenstein 2008), the existence of strong democratic institutions allowed 
workers to impact the strategic choices of states by inserting their ideological demands 
for social welfare protection in the midst of neoliberal market transition. 
Orenstein’s democratic policy alternation theory offers an explanation for the 
swings in Cuba’s market liberalization policy throughout its socialist history, 
reflecting the changing demands of workers in response to the negative consequences 
suffered during periods of increased market liberalization.  However, his theory 
explains why states make certain strategic choices during transition and does not seek 
to explain the process by which the state and workers negotiate ideas and reach 
agreement on the limits of state market reform.  For that, the discussion turns to what 
is known about how ideas are exchanged between groups during transition and the 
politics of persuasion. 
Ideas and Collective Action 
Groups of actors comprehend the world and its changes through sets of ideas 
(Anner 2004).  These ideas, as well as the state institutions and the relationships 
between workers and the state create, promote or restrain labor outcomes during 
transition (Sabel 1982).  Consequently, collective action within and between groups is 
made possible through shared values and understanding, which assist actors in 
determining allies and opponents (Della Porta and Diani 1999).  Actors then use 
 70 
cultural frames to provide meaning or interpretation to events and to provoke 
mobilization (Snow, Rochford, Jr., Worden and Benford 1986).  For example, Debra 
Javeline (2003) analyzed participants in the 1990s Russian protests over wage arrears 
and found that the key factor in whether workers participated or not is whether they 
knew whom to blame for the failure.  Those workers who protested were those who 
had been convinced of a specific enemy, while those who did not protest tended to be 
confused about who or what was responsible (Javeline 2003). 
The Javeline study of worker protest in Russia demonstrates that blame 
attribution can be used to analyze labor response and worker mobilization.  This 
supports my choice of conflict theory and blame attribution as an appropriate 
theoretical framework for explaining how the Cuban state and workers reach 
agreement on shared values with respect to market liberalization.  Viewing Cuban 
industrial relations transition through this framework, the state frames market reform 
in terms of a value both the state and workers share- saving Cuban socialism.  During 
the ensuing participatory process, the state then tries to convince workers that due to 
economic conditions caused by the United States and global capitalism (“them”), 
difficult market reform must be enacted in order to alleviate inefficiencies and save the 
achievements that they have worked so hard to attain under Cuban socialism (“us”).  
As my argument goes, if the state is successful in attributing blame in this manner, 
workers are more likely to feel compelled to support the state during the transition, 
thus delaying protest, because to behave otherwise would be seen- by the state and 
workers themselves- as a rejection of Cuban socialism. 
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According to Gallagher (2007), China also developed a frame to sell its market 
reform to workers.  It shifted the public debate from whether the reforms were 
capitalist, to whether it was in the nation’s best interest, or in other words from 
“liberalism” to “nationalism” (Gallagher 2007).  Thus, the state ran a political 
campaign to convince workers that Chinese nationalist ideology had not shifted to 
capitalism, but rather was in line with the more popular justification- “nationalistic 
developmentalism.”  The state justified this frame by suggesting that Chinese 
nationalist development required heavy foreign investment and other market reforms 
(Gallagher 2007).  With respect to whether workers accepted the state’s underlying 
justification for reform, evidence shows growing worker protest directed at the local 
state level, attributed mostly to frustration with the destruction of the social contract 
and workplace discrimination (Lee 2007). 
That states feel compelled to justify market liberalization policy has its roots in 
the need for political legitimacy and consensus.  Burawoy (2001) argues that in one-
party socialist systems, it is critical that the party and state not only justify their 
authority, but also educe consent from workers, which leads to a system of substantial 
worker control.  Joseph Stiglitz (2002) profoundly expresses the link between 
participation, shared ideas and political legitimacy: 
“If individuals believe they have had a meaningful 
participation in the decisions that are affecting them, 
they will be more willing to accept changes, even if they 
are adversely affected.  But if they believe that those 
changes have been imposed on them, either by outsiders 
or by illegitimate governments who have not taken their 
concerns into account, then resentment is more likely to 
mount and to lead to socially destructive outcomes.” 
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Fieldwork is needed to confirm how Cuban workers feel about the quality and 
effectiveness of their participatory mechanisms, but as detailed in Chapter 2, the 
Cuban state remains politically stable and has not yet had to face significant worker 
protest, despite market liberalization policies that have had adverse economic and 
societal effects. 
At least one very important one-party communist state, China, has not exactly 
followed Burawoy’s proscription for political legitimacy through consensus, and there 
is some evidence that its failure to afford meaningful participation during transition 
may be linked to the type of negative social outcome predicted by Stiglitz.  Prior to 
economic transition in the 1980s, the Chinese system of popular participation57 
required, much like Cuba’s, the participation of workers in national political debates 
(Gaochao 2004).  However, some scholars report that even before the decentralization 
of decision-making that accompanied the market reforms, fundamental workers’ 
issues were determined centrally by the state, rather than by workers in their 
enterprises (Gaochao 2004).  In addition, even perfunctory rights on paper were found 
to have been lost as a result of market liberalization (Gaochao 2004).  In her work on 
convergences and divergences in labor responses across ownership types in the 
“rustbelt” and “sunbelt” in China, Lee (2007) uncovers rising resentment in protests at 
the enterprise and city levels.  The protests, particularly those by “rustbelt” workers, 
were mainly found to be related to what workers felt was a broken social contract 
between the worker and the state (Lee 2007).   Gallagher (2007) suggests also that 
                                                
57 Chapter 4 contains more detail with respect to the change in worker participation 
laws during Chinese market liberalization. 
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growing managerial control and worker fragmentation has resulted in workers feeling 
marginalized (Gallagher 2007).  Thus, it appears, at least from the contrasting Cuban 
and Chinese cases, that worker participation influences to some extent how workers 
view market liberalization, but what do we know about how market liberalization has 
impacted worker participation? 
Worker Participation 
Despite the fact that some scholars have asserted that the extent to which 
workers participate in economic planning “lies at the heart of the problem of the 
democratization of production” (Fuller 1992), the relationship between market 
liberalization and democracy in the workplace remains understudied (Hatcher 2006).  
One obstacle to such research has been the lack of a clear definition of workplace 
democracy.  Not only is the existing literature wanting in terms of a clear 
conceptualization, it suffers from an absence of agreement on the conditions or 
purpose for democracy at work. 
Among the limited agreement found in the literature is a general consensus that 
regardless of national political context, workplace democracy, at the least, involves a 
reallocation of power to workers (Hatcher 2006; Nightingale 1982; Comisso 1979) 
over major organizational decisions (Hatcher 2006) that were traditionally subject to 
the unilateral direction of management (Comisso 1979).  Moreover, achieving 
workplace democracy is generally thought to require worker voice (Collom 2003; 
Rothschild 2000) in matters which materially affect them at the workplace 
(Nightingale 1982), but perhaps also in industry and government (Comisso 1979).  
Like the Cuban studies literature, the heterogeneity surrounding the conceptions and 
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lexicon for describing workplace democracy has been attributed mostly to varied 
ideological, political and economic interests of its proponents and opponents (Collom 
2003; Nightingale 1982).  Further complicating the matter is that the definition and 
appeal of workplace democracy also varies with the environment, particularly with 
respect to the national political context (Street 1983). 
For example, North American human relations scholars typically focus on 
forms of worker involvement confined to a hierarchical work organization structure 
(Nightingale 1982).  Under this theoretical framework, worker participation is 
presented as an alternative form of work organization to combat global competition 
(Applebaum and Batt 1994), achieve economic eminence in the global economy 
(Kochan and Osterman 1994), and increase levels of productivity (Markowitz 1996).  
On the other hand, scholars of socialist workplaces conceptualize workplace 
democracy as an issue of class that transforms the relations in production (Burawoy 
1985), and ideally includes greater solidarity among workers (Comisso 1979).  
Consequently, in these systems a focus on the overarching ideology governing 
industrial organization has been seen as an informative proxy for examining the 
“underlying interests” in workplace democracy (Collom 2003). 
The ownership and control granted to workers in a democratic workplace 
provides the legal foundation to protect and sustain democratic control (Rothschild 
2000).  Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci is one of the earliest theorists of workers’ 
control in planned economies.  He saw workers as producers and their enterprise-level 
councils as the base units in a workers’ state in which citizenship obligates each 
individual to be a productive member of the collective community (Comisso 1979).  
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This is similar to Ché’s “New Man” created under his BFS system in which he made it 
an obligation and a duty for every Cuban worker to be productive and efficient 
(Guevara 1971).  In these types of Marxist systems, actors’ roles are governed by a 
direct ideological and institutional relationship between worker participation at the 
enterprise level and in the broader political economy (Comisso 1979). 
Li (2004), a scholar of labor relations in the Chinese communist system, has 
stated that the creation of trust between workers and management requires that 
workers have power over management “opportunistic” behavior (Li 2004: 360).  She 
says this is possible either through an operative collective bargaining system in the 
presence of a well-developed social security system, or legislatively through 
unambiguous worker participation rights (Li 2004).  In fact, Burawoy has gone so far 
as to state “all socialisms have the characteristic feature of fusing production politics 
and state politics” (1985: 158).  In such systems, participation is a value in itself, as 
well as a component of industrial organization (Street 1983).  Burawoy describes two 
separate ways in which the merger of production and state politics guides society in 
socialist systems.  In “collective self-management,” workers as producers drive 
change in a system, while in “state socialism” change is directed from above 
(Burawoy 1985). 
The connection between worker participation and the relationship between the 
actors has been established by scholars of Yugoslav self-management who have 
shown that worker participation created a profound connection between the party and 
the workers (Meister 1965), and that unions served as two-way transmission belts 
through which enterprise actors were brought into line with the party’s social goals 
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while worker control at the enterprise influenced the party (Comisso 1979).  In the 
Cuban case, in the period prior to the 1970s, the Cuban unions were negatively 
referred to as “two-way” transmission belts because they were seen as simply 
mouthpieces for the promotion of state economic policy whose without commitment 
to worker participation (Alexander 2002; Fuller 1986).  However, since the 80s some 
scholars have found the union to display “critical distance” (Dilla 2009) from the state 
and party, and to be particularly involved in creating an environment for lively worker 
participation (Fuller 1992; Zimbalist and Eckstein 1987).  However, this does not 
appear to have been the case in China. 
Li (2004) argues that the lesson the Chinese market reformers took from the 
Yugoslav self-management experience is that it leads to poor economic performance.  
Throughout the Chinese market liberalization process, market reforms have reportedly 
harbored general opposition to worker participation as an institution, despite some 
legislative reform granting certain participatory rights to workers’ representative 
congresses (Li 2004).  In fact, scholars suggest that management control in China has 
simply grown stronger with market liberalization (Gallagher 2007; Li 2004; Gaochao 
2004), as doubts linger as to the effectiveness of the workers’ representatives (Li 
2004). 
The full extent of the impact of worker participation has not yet been studied in 
Cuba (Ludlam 2009), a void this thesis seeks to fill.  Linda Fuller (1992) conducted 
the last known comprehensive study, but it covers only the immediate post-
revolutionary period and ends before the Special Period reforms.  In her 1992 study, 
Fuller set out to show that workplace democracy existed in Cuba, and that it increased 
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during the 1970s and 1980s.  She was able to suggest a typology for measuring 
workplace democracy in Cuba, which is employed as a starting point for analysis of 
contemporary participation.  She examines several major issues she claims are 
pertinent to workplace democracy, including: (1) participation in economic decision-
making; (2) the nature of production decision-making; (3) the extent of worker 
collective action; (4) the arenas determining how production is controlled and (5) the 
amount of participatory forums.  In her earlier work, she also indentified three stages 
of production decisions in the Cuban industrial relations system: (1) formulation, (2) 
implementation and (3) evaluation (Fuller 1985). 
Though fieldwork will identify the nature and extent of participatory 
mechanisms in the contemporary Cuban system, it is known at the very least that there 
exist worker assemblies based in the workplace that serve as forums for decision-
making at the enterprise and for popular participation in the broader issues of political 
economy.  In addition, the state is currently employing its mass public consultations in 
the Cuban process of national debate over transition in the political economy.  I 
believe that fieldwork will show that the structure of workplace participation in Cuba 
ensures that the party and the state must employ the participatory mechanism in order 
to legitimate their authority and gain agreement from workers on market reform, 
which arguably leads to a system of substantial worker control during transition. 
Summary 
This chapter provided a review of the literature motivating my argument about 
the stability of Cuban socialism notwithstanding market liberalization, and the 
importance of national participatory institutions in bringing forth that outcome.  While 
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much fieldwork must be done in establishing the “sticking points” of potential conflict 
in the Cuban system, the importance of worker participation to the Cuban industrial 
relations system suggests that absent change to it, there will be no fundamental change 
to the institutions of Cuba’s socialist industrial relations system. 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPARATIVE TRANSFORMATIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter describes comparative transitions in other contexts to allow for 
further exploration of the similarities and differences in market liberalizations and 
their impact on workers.  Because Cuba is geographically located in Latin America, 
but is also a single-party socialist state, I review existing empirical and theoretical 
knowledge about industrial relations transition in the Latin American, post-socialist 
and Sino-Vietnamese cases.  In each section, I present a summary of what we know 
first about market liberalization in each region, then what is known about the impact 
of market liberalization on workers and worker participation in each context. 
Latin American Transformations 
A. Market Liberalization 
Latin American countries faced many “critical junctures”- trigger events for 
institutional change- in the 1970s and 1980s, including the military repression of trade 
unions in the 1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s (Collier and Collier 2002).  It was 
the debt crisis that led to the economic opening in the 1990s for most of Latin America 
(Munck 2004; Dombois and Pries 1994).  In addition, a spate of “pluralistic 
democratization” occurred in the Latin American region (Anner 2004: 88), about 
which there is some debate as to the sequence of transition, with some scholars finding 
that democratization (political pluralism) preceded market liberalization (M. Cook 
2007) and others treating the events as simultaneous occurrences (Anner 2008). 
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There is general agreement that most countries in the region initiated 
development models that included market liberalization policies, which some scholars 
have referred to as “economic restructuring,” and equated with “neoliberalism” (M. 
Cook 1999).  Affected countries received pressure from international actors such as 
the Inter-Development Bank and the World Bank to implement the market 
liberalization policies of the “Washington Consensus” as conditions for economic 
assistance (Collier and Collier 2002; Munck 2004).  In line with the neoliberal 
program proposed by such external actors, economic reform in the region was part of a 
switch in broader development strategy from import substitution models to export 
oriented models (Munck 2004).  The specific policies enacted by Latin American 
countries included foreign direct investment, trade liberalization, privatization, 
deregulation of the labor market and fiscal austerity (M. Cook 1999) and labor market 
flexibility (Munck 2004).  These policies were not unlike those employed in Cuba, at 
least in nature. 
B. Impact on Labor 
Changes in economic, fiscal, and trade policy are viewed as the key variables 
driving the structural, legal, and political reforms affecting workers and unions in the 
Latin American transitions (M. Cook 1999).  Economic policy reform eventually led 
to decreased state economic activity in most of the region (M. Cook 1999; Munck 
2004), as states privatized many aspects of social welfare (M. Cook 1999; Dombois 
and Pries 1994), including education, social security, and pension-fund systems (M. 
Cook 1999).  However, the role of the state was found to be crucial in Mexico, whose 
leaders created an environment to favor export capital over workers (Pozas 1993).  In 
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addition, it was through state action in most countries that laws were changed, 
including flexibilization policies and, in some cases, protective labor legislation, 
suggesting that at least some states retained a strong role in industrial relations (M. 
Cook 1998).  Cuba’s Special Period restructuring was not immune from pressures to 
cut state expenditures.  In fact, the Cuban government cut subsidies to state enterprises 
and brought budget deficits below 4% (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a).  However, unlike 
the transitions in this region, Cuba resisted the privatization social welfare benefits for 
workers. 
Although Latin American states pursued market liberalization, in some 
countries many basic labor rights that were absent during the preceding military 
dictatorships58 were restored and some were expanded (M. Cook 1998; M. Cook 1999; 
Anner 2004).  This increase in protective labor reforms has been attributed to 
pluralistic democratization, domestic rights advocacy, and international pressure 
through the threat of trade sanctions (M. Cook 1998).  However, notwithstanding the 
restoration and expansion of basic labor rights and the increase in protective reforms, 
scholars of Latin American industrial relations have noted a tendency of states in the 
region to demobilize labor’s role in industrial relations systems in order thwart its 
ability to contest economic reform (M. Cook 1999). 
Previous to this particular period of political and industrial transformation in 
the region, namely from the 1960s through the 1980s, the success of the Cuban 
                                                
58 Mark Anner (2004) notes that Latin America from 1960s to the 1980s, suffered 
from extreme authoritarian rule, whose leaders, out of a perceived threat created by the 
Cuban revolution, suspended and restricted basic labor rights “in the interest of 
national security and development” (Anner 2004: 88). 
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Revolution led to the radicalization of the union movement in several countries in 
Latin America (Anner 2004).  However, military rulers found a way to use state 
corporatist mechanisms to instill in unions a belief in the “harmony of class interests,” 
(Anner 2004: 125).  The result was that in the 1990s, Latin American unions declined 
in power at both the national and individual firm level where flexibilization was found 
to have reduced worker control over production and working conditions (M. Cook 
1999).  Some scholars say the decline in union density rates show that the strength of 
organized labor in Latin America deteriorated during the transition period (Anner 
2004).  Maria Cook (1999) has attributed the decline in union power to deterioration in 
union membership due to a decline in formal-sector employment, the decline of 
manufacturing and expansion of services, reduced public-sector employment and an 
increase in temporary and part-time employment.  In addition, increases in part-time 
and temporary employment and the entry of more women into the labor market, was 
found to complicate the strategic response of unions (Catalano and Novick in Portella 
and Wachendorfer 1995). 
On top of the decline in union power in the region, labor market flexibilization 
across the region was found to have held important consequences for the roles and 
relationships between firms, workers, states and unions (M. Cook 1999).  For 
example, the implementation of flexible techniques and associated workplace 
practices was found to create new conflicts in the workplace, particularly in the areas 
of wages, training and productivity (M. Cook 1999), as well as productivity bonuses, 
skill structure, task rotation and relationships with supervisors (Pozas 1993).  With 
respect to worker participation in the region- despite discourse suggesting that the new 
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labor market flexibility would be accompanied by increased participatory mechanisms 
(M. Cook 1999; Pozas 1993)- there is no evidence that it ever occurred.  By contrast, 
in the Cuban case the literature holds that there is some evidence that market 
liberalization actually led to an increase in worker participation.  Additionally, at least 
one scholar has reported the presence of cooperative flexibility rather than conflict in 
Cuban SOEs (Evenson 2008). 
In sum, the simultaneous, or near simultaneous democratizations, in the 
political and economic systems of Latin American countries after the debt crisis led to 
neoliberal market liberalization in predicted forms of increased FDI, privatization, 
labor market flexibilization and deregulation and fiscal austerity.  The impact on labor 
was largely negative due to privatization of welfare services, demobilization of unions 
and a lack of worker participation.  In contrast, Cuba’s market liberalization was not 
predicated by a debt crisis, nor driven by the neoliberal framework of the Washington 
Consensus.  Though it shared some reforms, such as labor flexibilization and 
reduction in public sector employment, in the Cuban case, workers were not subjected 
to market liberalization in the absence of continued social protection, or in the face of 
a demobilized union. 
Post-Socialist Transformations 
A. Market Liberalization 
There is vast scholarly research comparing the transitions in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe (Croan, et. al 1992; Przeworski 1991).  In attempts to devise a unified 
model for democratization, experts found a ready comparison between the Latin 
American transformations of the 1970s and 1980s, and the Eastern European 
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transitions of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  To this group of scholars, the Latin 
American combination of political and market liberalization appeared particularly 
comparable to the fall of Soviet-styled socialism and the transformation to free market 
economy in Eastern Europe.  Transition theorist Adam Przeworksi found the 
similarities so striking that he declared that the East had become the South (1991).  In 
what Béla Greskovits (1998) refers to as the “postcommunist breakdown of 
democracy literature,” researchers attempted to explore how societal actors respond to 
transition from communist or socialist ideology in the economic and political arenas.  
Experts predicted grand working-class opposition to the imminent democratization of 
the political and economic system in Eastern Europe (Fuller 1999).  However, that 
opposition did not rise. 
The post-socialist transitions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union generally 
followed a model of simultaneous political democratization and radical and rapid 
market liberalization (Ost 2009).  Like the transitions in Latin America, economic 
restructuring was designed and financially supported by international agencies with a 
neoliberal ideology and an anti-communism agenda (Orenstein 2008).  Thus, the 
economic restructuring programs, also like those in Latin America, featured radical 
market liberalization programs (Ost 2009). 
Burawoy (2001) compared the Russian transition to those in Central European 
countries, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and also China and found that the 
variances in the nature, extent and pace of transitions depended on the antecedent 
conditions before democratization and alternative strategies of transition.   Burawoy’s 
study found that before the collapse of socialism, both Hungary and Poland had 
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already transitioned to a market economy that was significantly more advanced than 
Russia’s had been prior to democratization. With respect to alternative strategies of 
transition, he found that both Czechoslovakia and Hungary chose gradual economic 
liberalization with protective measures, while Russia chose a rapid pace for transition.  
These differences in state strategies are believed to have been influenced by a state’s 
commitment to new democratic institutions (Orenstein 2008). 
B. Impact on Labor 
With the political and economic transitions came a dismantling of the social 
welfare state, which at that time was being framed as “unproductive” (Crowley and 
Ost 2001: 2).  Although there was some variance across states, workers in the post-
socialist transitions suffered a dramatic wage decline (Crowley and Ost 2001).  For 
example, “[C]ompared with 1989 levels, average real per capita income was down by 
13% in Hungary in 1993, by 12% in Poland and by 18% in the Czech Republic, and 
by 1995 average real wages had gone down [compared with 1989 levels] by over one-
fifth in Hungary and over one-quarter in Poland, though by less than one-tenth in the 
Czech Republic” (Vanhuysse 2004: 421).  Unemployment also increased.  
“Unemployment, officially non-existent under state socialism, shot up to 9% in 
Hungary and 12% in Poland in 1991, and further increased to reach 12% and 16% 
respectively in 1993. In the Czech Republic, however, it remained much lower at 
around 3%” (Vanhuysse 2004: 421-422). 
Apparently the most surprising finding in the post-socialist transitions was the 
lack of worker protest despite the wage and unemployment effects of transition.  
 86 
Scholars had been convinced that the level of economic depression should have 
brought with it significant worker protest.  Vanhuysse (2004: 422) stated: 
“In combination with cuts in social expenditure and state 
subsidies, these transitional costs hit many groups who 
were accustomed to extensive social protection. In terms 
of social peace and democratic consolidation, this made 
for a potentially explosive cocktail.”  
 
However, not only did that opposition not arrive, the post-socialist strike action has 
even been called “peaceful” (Vanhuysse 2004: 422). 
 Stephen Crowley and David Ost (2001) assembled case studies of ten separate 
Eastern European countries to analyze why European unions remained weak social 
and political actors throughout the region during the transformation.  They found 
unions to be weak in all ten countries, notwithstanding economic, political and 
institutional differences.  They concluded that the communist legacy had an 
institutional and ideological impact that weakened collective action during the 
transition.  More specifically, communism carried with it (1) a history of union and 
management being closely related and sharing the same side, (2) a need to convert the 
role of the union from that of benefits provider on behalf of the state to rights defender 
on behalf of the worker, and (3) a mindset in workers and unions that unions were part 
of the problem, creating a “crisis in socialist ideas” (2001: 229). 
 The implications of this work to the Cuban case brings about an important 
distinction in the Eastern European cases, which is that most of the blame for the 
unpleasantness of the political and economic transition was attributed to socialism 
itself and all of its institutions, including the unions (Ost 2009).  As was discussed 
earlier, the survival of socialism, as opposed to its destruction, was framed by the 
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government as the underlying justification for reform.  This being the case, Cuban 
trade unions, as noted in Chapter 2, have been key in the facilitation of worker 
participation in market reform, as opposed to being an enemy to which blame is 
attached. 
 In sum, the post-socialist cases represent a very different political environment 
under which transition occurred.  In the Cuban case, workers’ value of Cuban 
socialism, its institutions and the conquistas of the Revolution are ones they seek to 
protect, rather than destroy.  It happens also that socialism is what structures the 
workplace democracy institutions in Cuba, affording Cuban workers a process for 
negotiating matters of political economy and production.  Fieldwork is necessary to 
determine how workers actually feel about participatory mechanisms, though the 
existing literature discussed in Chapter 2 establishes that, unlike in Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s, Cuban socialism itself remains popular, or at least preferred. 
Sino-Vietnamese Transformations 
A. Market Liberalization 
Institutional economists have held China as an exemplary case of evolutionary 
transition- “a market economy nurtured and protected within the womb of the party 
state” (Burawoy and Verdery 1999: 5).   China’s economic reforms were implemented 
gradually, focused on the economy only, and represented a wide scope of changes 
involving SOE reform (Dickson 2007) and FDI liberalization (Gallagher 2002). 
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Substantial SOE reform started in the early 1980s59 (Li 2004, p. 359).  The 
communist party’s expressed goal of the reform was to establish in state-owned 
enterprises “transparent property rights, clearly identified rights and responsibilities, 
separation of government and enterprise, and scientific management.” (Li 2004: 362-
363).  SOE reform was increase again in 1997 when the party expanded privatization 
of small SOEs and collective-owned enterprises to include large and medium-sized 
SOEs, which were to be restructured as shareholding corporations (Li 2004).  
Decentralization of decision-making to enterprise managers, who were granted 
unilateral control over all the vital aspects of factory governance, was also found to be 
a priority for Chinese transition (Gaochao 2004, p. 324).  In contrast, Cuban SOE 
reform in the late 1990s required enterprise management to consult with the union and 
workers in the creation of a business plan for final approval prior to implementation 
(Peters 2001), maintaining worker participation. 
China’s FDI law was also changed in the 1980s, opening its economy to 
foreign investment in three main forms of FDI: joint ventures, cooperative joint 
ventures, and wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries (Huang 2003).  Dickinson (2007) 
asserts that China afforded FDI favorable treatment in order to induce more foreign 
investment into the country because its political legitimacy was predicated on 
economic growth. This “favorable treatment” came in the form of the active 
promotion of FDI through more preferential policy treatments “far exceeding” that 
                                                
59 However, see Marangos who claims that SOE and privatization reforms began in 
1995 when “[i]t was announced that 1000 of the largest state-owned enterprises were 
to remain under state control and that the 13,000 large and medium-sized state-owned 
enterprises, as well as most of the 350,000 smaller companies, were to be 
denationalized” (2004: 601). 
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accorded to its domestic private firms (Huang 2003).  The Chinese state made foreign 
investment the basis of its political legitimacy by fostering this belief, and then 
justifying it, through a campaign to convince workers that they needed a globally 
competitive national industry. The result is said to have been a reformulated ideology 
that shifted importance from state ownership to “national ownership” (Gallagher 
2007).  By contrast, in the Cuban case 100 percent foreign-owned ventures were not 
possible before 1995, and its granting is still very restricted (Pérez-López 2005).  
Further, in framing this reform policy, the Cuban state called referred to it publically 
as the only way to save the achievements of the revolution in the face of global crisis 
(Gordy 2006). 
China has been described as pursuing a pragmatic, rather than ideological 
approach to privatization, starting with agricultural reform  (Marangos 2004).  The 
privatization process has been described as one initiated by local governments- and 
encouraged by the central government- because of budget constraints and increased 
competition from the non-state sector (Marangos 2004).  However, it is the “private,” 
“non-state” village enterprise sector (“TVE”) which has been described as comprising 
the most significant structural adjustment (Marangos 2004).  TVEs have been 
described as enterprises administratively controlled and owned by local governments 
at the township and village levels which serve as the “main engine of industrial growth 
in the reform period” (Marangos 2004: 600).   In fact, some scholars claim that an 
important part of the “private” sector in China is actually controlled by the party at the 
local or national level (Ferrero 2001; Morduch and Sicular 2000; Solnick 1996; Shirk 
1993). 
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Thus, in comparing China and Cuba, one of the biggest differences is in the 
strategic choices of the state relating to FDI liberalization.  China’s reform process 
focused on early and extensive use of FDI (Gallagher 2002).   Although there seemed 
to be no need for flexibility in the Chinese industrial relations system prior to global 
competition (Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002), Chinese labor practices have shifted 
overwhelmingly toward favoring firm autonomy, flexibility, and managerial control of 
worker organizations (Gallagher 2007).  This is as a result of greater decentralization 
in SOEs and growing levels of FDI (Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002). 
In circumstances almost identical to those faced by Cuba, the disappearance of 
the Soviet Union and Easter Bloc and the economic crisis that followed obliged the 
Vietnamese state to consider new policies to support its devastated economy and to 
secure political stability (Bunck 1997).  Vietnam’s program included the privatization 
of state enterprises, radical discontinuation of subsidies to SOEs, the abolishment of 
thousands of state firms and the lay-off of almost a million workers (Bunck 1997: 21), 
and a commitment to the recruiting of FDI.  Specifically, in 1997, Vietnam was able to 
bring in $2 billion due to favorable FDI laws that gave FDI a protected and 
foreseeable structure (Mesa-Lago 2007).  However, unlike in Vietnam, declining FDI 
in Cuba has been attributed to a lack of inducements, as well as government 
restrictions and the revocation of contracts (Travieso-Diaz and Trumbull 2003; Mesa-
Lago 2007).  Further, Cuba’s economic restructuring has been more restricted than 
those of China and Vietnam (Mesa-Lago 2007); however, at least one scholar believes 
Cuba is following “China or Pinochet model of economic reform without political 
reform” (Amaro 1998).  To this point, Perkins (in Domínguez 2004) also argues that 
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Vietnam is a good comparative case for Cuba because of the size of its economy, 
former deep reliance on the Soviet Union and the timing of its reforms, which were 
also implemented under a U.S. embargo.  Despite these admitted similarities, it must 
be noted that unlike Cuba’s limited and restricted incursion into liberalized markets, 
Vietnam engaged in immense and radical economic reforms (Fritzen 2003).  Julie 
Bunck, a scholar on women in post-Cold War Cuba and Vietnam, explains that Cuba 
chose the more cautious and less costly route, noting that the Vietnamese were drawn 
to the idea of rapid economic development, while the Cubans preferred incremental 
changes (1997). 
B. Impact on Labor 
The impact of market liberalization in China includes wage disparity, job 
insecurity and the loss of welfare provisions and participatory rights.  The traditional 
egalitarian wage system was replaced with an incentive-based pay-for-performance 
system (Gaochao 2004), despite institutional, social and political discouragement of 
wage differentiation between workers (Gaochao 2004).  Labor market flexibility has 
lead to job insecurity as lifetime employment has been replaced with short-term 
contract work (Gaochao 2004).  And, like in other socialist transformations, the 
elimination of traditional socialist welfare provisions such as medical facilities in 
factories, as well as schools, was found to be an additional concern of workers  
(Gaochao 2004). 
The Chinese state has allowed these adverse consequences, despite the fact that 
studies show that what Chinese workers want is egalitarianism, job security, social 
welfare and participation.  As Gaochao (2004) notes: 
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“[Chinese] workers prefer job saving and job loyalty. 
Any reform which threatens workers’ job security is 
tantamount to assaulting workers’ fundamental interests. 
This finding also shows that for most workers, the main 
concern is not so much their dependency on the 
workplace, but the insecurity of their jobs….[F]indings 
confirm that Chinese workers have similar preferences 
to those of workers around the world. Three decades of 
socialism have only enhanced Chinese workers’ desire 
for the alternatives which are fundamental to workers’ 
interests…The majority (71.3 percent) of the 
respondents prefer improving, rather than eliminating 
these services” (2004: 326-327).  
 
Unlike in most other transitions, some data exists on the impact of market 
liberalization on worker participation in China.  As in the Cuban socialist system, 
under the former Chinese system workers were obliged to participate in political 
discourse in the political economy at large and in the workplace, with very limited 
discretion afforded to enterprise managers (Gaochao 2004).  However, Gaochao 
(2004) asserts that with the transition and decentralization, many decisions pertaining 
to issues such as job security, wage scheme and welfare provisions have been 
delegated to factory managers.  However, in 1988, the All-People Owned Enterprise 
Law (“Enterprise Law”) was passed, requiring SOEs to adopt democratic 
management, which should give power to a congress workers’ representatives as the 
“organ in which the employees exercise the power of democratic management” (Li 
2004: 363).   The Enterprise Law gives workers’ representatives authority to evaluate 
SOE management decisions, and to participate in production decisions concerning 
work rules, wages, and the distribution of benefits.  As Li (2004) explains:  
“The Enterprise Law provides a congress of employees’ 
representatives with the following rights and power. 
First, the congress of employees’ representatives reviews 
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major management decisions, annual business plans, 
major investment projects, allocation of retained profit, 
and changes in ownership structures, and makes 
suggestions or proposals. Second, it approves or 
disapproves wage and bonus distribution schemes, work 
protection measures, work rules, and other important 
rules and policies. Third, it decides the use of the 
employees’ welfare fund, the distribution of housing, 
and other major issues concerning employees’ welfare. 
Fourth, it evaluates and oversees the managerial staff 
and makes reward or punishment proposals. Fifth, the 
congress of employees’ representatives may elect the 
manager of the enterprise, provided this is required by a 
decision by the government office that is in charge of 
the enterprise.” (Li 2004: 363-364) Emphasis in 
original. 
 
The Enterprise Law as enacted by the National Congress of People’s 
Representatives has been described as the result of a political compromise between 
reformers who believe that worker participation is bad for economic performance, and 
the trade unions and communist party who favored it (Li 2004).  However, because 
most of the SOEs were restructured in 1992 into corporations, the Corporation Law 
enacted in 1993 significantly reduced the participatory power of workers’ 
representatives. Under the Corporation Law, workers’ representatives lost the right to 
managerial review of important decisions; the ability to veto or approve wage schemes 
and work rules or to decide welfare distribution (Li 2004).  Further, it has been 
suggested that in actual practice, the decision by workers’ congress’ to exercise 
existing participatory rights has varied, and that management has become more 
dominant in the face of ineffective unions (Li 2004).  Contrarily, in the Cuban case, 
the worker participation scheme pre-dated market liberalization and was part of its 
1976 Constitution (República of Cuba 2002).  In addition, its dispute resolution 
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through the joint committees comprising the enterprise-level Organs of Labor Justice 
was created in 1977 (MTSS 1997).  To date there have been no laws enacted to restrict 
worker participation rights, or the rights of worker mass organizations. 
Gallagher (2007) has suggested that without political transitions, trade unions 
in China “have gone in the same direction as those in the post-socialist world: toward 
further marginalization and weakness” (2007: 96).  She points to management 
domination of worker organizations, particularly the trade union, as factors in 
increasing managerial control and worker fragmentation (Gallagher 2007).  Labor 
conflict has been found to being increasing rapidly, despite increasing use of labor 
dispute resolution processes (Gallagher 2007), attributed to an increasing 
dissatisfaction of workers to growing marginalization at the workplace (Gallagher 
2007).   However, in the Cuban case, labor unions have been found to have increased 
in autonomy and effectiveness in facilitating worker participation since the 1970s, 
including playing a large role in educating workers in matters of political economy 
and production to ready them for the negotiation process (Fuller 1992). 
Lee (2007) finds convergences and divergences in the types of protests across 
Chinese regions.  The convergences include (1) decentralized, or “cellular” activism 
limited to enterprise or city level (as opposed to across regions) and (2) passionate 
protest directed at local level state officials (as opposed to central political leaders).  
However, there are regional divergences between “rustbelt” workers, who mainly 
protest due to poor goods provision by the government framed as a broken social 
contract, and “sunbelt” workers, who protest against discrimination and rely heavily 
on the new legal institutions that are supposed to protect them, but are used against 
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them.  Similarly, in Vietnam, the state’s preferential policies for FDI has led to 
growing tensions between the state and the unions and spontaneous collective action 
in response to flexibility in both FDI and state owned enterprises.  Most of those 
reported strikes have occurred in the FDI sector (Tran 2007).  In the Cuban case, the 
right to strike is not mentioned in the constitution (República de Cuba 2002), but there 
have been no reports of significant worker protest as of yet linked to market 
liberalization or retreat. 
In sum, the comparison between the Sino-Vietnamese cases and Cuba 
highlight the role of the state in determining political, economic and industrial 
relations outcomes.  All three states are invested in maintaining socialist, one-party 
rule, but they have been able to achieve that despite very different approaches to 
negotiation of reform with workers. 
Summary 
In this chapter, as well as throughout the literature review comprising this 
thesis, comparative transformations in other contexts generally lead to an expectation 
that market liberalization results in a negative impact on labor, despite differences in 
nature, extent or pace of market reform, or even regime type.  However, worker 
control and participation during market liberalization has declined in every other 
context discussed here during transition, while worker participation in Cuba tends to 
increase during times of change.  These differences in labor outcomes, including 
growing worker protest in single-party socialist states, highlights differences in 
national participatory institutions and the ability of workers to participate, or at least 
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believe they can, in the decisions impacting their present working condition and future 
social well-being.
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APPENDIX A 
SELECT ECONOMIC DATA CUBA 
 
Economic 
indicator 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000* 
Rate of 
growth 
GDP (%) 
1.2 -3.1 -10.7 -11.6 -14.9 0.7 2.5 7.8 2.5 1.2 6.2  
Sugar 
Output 
(million 
tons) 
8.121 8.100 7.700 7.000 4.280 4.000 3.300 4.450 4.252 3.200   
GDP 
earned by 
Agriculture 
(%)* 
           7 
Oil Output 
(million 
tons) 
0.718  0.550 0.882 1.107 1.299 1.471 1.475 1.462 1.600   
GDP 
earned by 
Industry 
(%)* 
           46 
GDP 
earned by 
Services 
(%)* 
           47 
Inflation 
rate (%) 
    19.7 25.7 11.2 0.5 2.9 5.0   
Budget 
surplus or 
deficit (% 
of GDP) 
-7.2    -33.5 -7.4 -3.5 -2.5 -2.0 -2.5   
Hard 
currency 
debt 
($billion) 
6.2 7.0 8.4  8.8 9.1 10.5 10.5 10.1 10.4   
Population 
(million) 
10.5     10.96 10.98 11.01 11.04 11.07   
 
Table from Jeffries 2001: 279 (Citing Source Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López (1999:25); 
Pastor and Zimbalist (1995: 708); Zimbalist (1993b; 152, 164); Deere (1997: 651, 
657); Financial Times, Survey, 24 March 1999; Financial Times, 4 January 2000, p. 
5) 
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*2000 Data from EarthTrends 2003 
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APPENDIX B 
GUEVARA’S BUDGET FINANCE SYSTEM (BFS)60 
 
The BFS 
 
1. Finances should be centrally controlled; enterprises operate with a budget and 
hold no independent funds. 
2. Money serves as a means of account, a price reflection of an enterprise’s 
performance, not as a means of payment or as a form of financial compulsion. 
There is no credit or interest but only planned investment directed by the  state 
according to the national development strategy. 
3. The socialist economy functions as one big factory.  There are no financial 
relations or commodity exchange between state-owned enterprises because 
there is no change in ownership when products are transferred between   them. 
4. Education, training and salary structures foster a concept of work as a    
social duty, decommodifying labour by gradually cutting the link between 
work and remuneration.  Education must be linked to production and        
self-improvement to economic development 
5. The law of value and the Plan give expression to contradictory and 
antagonistic forms of social organisation of production and distribution.  
Planning allows the conscious organisation of the national economy in 
pursuit of political objectives.  The Plan must be democratically formulated 
by workers, but its fulfillment is ensured by a system of supervision, 
inspection and economic analysis in real time, inventory controls and   
annual reports.  These are elements of ‘administrative control’, and 
alternative to the financial control applied under the Auto-Financing System 
(AFS).  Administrative mechanisms, combined with appeals to 
consciousness, are the main levers for increasing efficiency. 
6. Lowering production costs, not the profit motive, is the key to increasing 
productivity.  It must be accompanied by quality controls. 
7. The most advanced forms of technology and management techniques 
possible should be borrowed from capitalist corporations without fear of 
‘ideological contamination’- preparing for technological advances even   
while struggling to overcome backwardness. 
8. Flexibility is necessary in decentralising without losing control and 
centralising without curbing initiative.  Tapping into the creative energy of 
workers to find solutions to daily production problems means encouraging 
                                                
60 This list of the key principles of Ché Guevara’s Budget Finance System and his 
methodology for political economy is reproduced from Helen Yaffe’s book, Ché 
Guevara: The Economics of a Revolution (2009), as referenced in the bibliography of 
this thesis. 
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the process of learning by doing, trial and error, making corrections sobre la 
marcha (on the move), and promoting the view that commitment to 
production is a revolutionary act. 
9. Workers must appropriate the production process, determining the plan   and 
developing the productive forces for themselves as the collective owners of 
the means of production.  This is essential for transforming surplus value (in 
capitalism) into surplus product (in socialism) and production for exchange 
(exchange-value) into production for use (use-value). 
10. Under capitalism, competition for profits constantly revolutionises the 
productive forces.  Socialist society must foster the application of science  
and technology to production without the profit motive.  Research institutes 
prepare for immediate and future developments, working closely with the 
relevant ministries, enterprises and student faculties. 
11. Economic development strategy should focus on the full chain of    
production from raw materials to electronics and automation.  This is 
essential for securing an independent socialist economy and obtaining value-
added from exports. 
12. There is a dialectical relationship between consciousness and production.  
Incentives are the key to raising productivity and efficiency.  Material 
incentives must be gradually replaced by moral incentives and the concept of 
work as a social duty, replacing alienation from the production process and 
the antagonism generated by class struggle with integration and solidarity. 
13. There is a need to create forums for criticism and open debate, being 
determined to get to the root of problems in order to solve them.  Leaders 
must be responsible and accountable.  It is essential to work with technical 
experts regardless of their political affiliations, harnessing their expertise     
in the interests of socialist production and integrating them into the 
revolutionary process. 
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APPENDIX C 
NATIONAL TRADE UNIONS OF CUBA 
National Union of Transportation 
Workers (Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores del Transporte) 
National Union of Construction Workers 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de 
la Construcción) 
National Union of Agricultural and 
Forestry Workers (Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores Agropecuarlos y 
Forestales) 
National Union of Light Industry Workers 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de 
la Industria Ligera) 
National Union of Chemical, Mining and 
Energy Workers (Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores de las Industrias Química, 
la Minería y la Energética)  
National Union of Civil Defense Workers 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores 
Civiles de la Defensa) 
Union of Commercial, Gastronomical and 
Service Workers (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores del Comercio, de la 
Gastronomía y los Servicios) 
National Union of Communications, 
Information and Electronics Workers 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de 
Comunicación, Informática y 
Electrónica) 
National Union of Cultural Workers 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de 
la Cultura) 
National Union of Education, Science and 
Sports Workers (Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores de la Educación, Ciencia y 
El Deporte) 
Nation Union of Food Workers 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de 
Alimentación) 
National Union of Health Workers 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de 
la Salud) 
National Union of Hotel and Tourism 
Workers* (Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajaderos de la Hotelería y Turismo) 
National Union of Merchant Marine, Port 
and Fishing Workers (Sindicato Nacional 
de Trabajadores de Marina Mercante, 
Puertas y Pesca) 
National Union of Metal and Electronic 
Workers (Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores Metalúrgicos y 
Electrónicos) 
National Union of Public Administration 
Workers (Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores de la Administración 
Pública) 
National Union of Science Workers* 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de 
las Ciencias) 
National Union of Sugar Workers 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores 
Azucareros) 
National Union of Tobacco Workers 
(Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores 
Tobacoleros) 
National Association of Innovators 
(Asociación Nacional de Innovadores y 
Racionalizadores) 
 
*Established within the last 18 years (National Lawyers Guild 2002).
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APPENDIX D 
CTC AND NATIONAL UNION STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Assembly 
Council of State 
CTC National Secretariat 
National Union 
National Union 
Provincial Committee 
CTC 
Provincial Committee 
CTC 
Municipal Committee 
National Union 
Municipal Committee 
National Union 
Section 
National Union 
Bureau 
National Union 
Section 
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APPENDIX E 
Interviews 
 
CTC provincial leadership, Artemisa Province, Cuba. February 2009 at the Lázaro 
Peña School. Conducted in Spanish by the author. 
 
 
Valerino, Elio. February 2002 at the CTC Headquarters in Havana, Cuba.   
 
Laza Figerrero, Martina. September 20, 2010 at the Lázaro Peña trade union school, 
San Agustín, La Lisa, City of Havana, Cuba. 
 
 
Ramón, Teresa. September 27, 2010 at the Lázaro Peña trade union school, San 
Agustín, La Lisa, City of Havana, Cuba. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
